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ABSTRACT
This paper assesses the impact of competition on racial discrimination. The dismantling of inter- and
intrastate bank restrictions by U.S. states from the mid-1970s to the mid-1990s reduced financial market
imperfections, lowered entry barriers facing nonfinancial firms, and boosted the rate of new firm formation.
We use bank deregulation to identify an exogenous intensification of competition in the nonfinancial
sector, and evaluate its impact on the racial wage gap, which is that component of the black-white
wage differential unexplained by Mincerian characteristics. We find that bank deregulation reduced
the racial wage gap by spurring the entry of non- financial firms. Consistent with taste-based theories,
competition reduced both the racial wage gap and racial segregation in the workplace, particularly
in states with a comparatively high degree of racial prejudice, where competition-enhancing bank




















More than four decades after the Civil Rights Act, large disparities in wage rates persist
between black and white Americans (Smith and Welch, 1989, Donohue and Heckman, 1991,
Altonji and Blank, 1999, and Neal, 2006). Yet, researchers have not fully determined the
degree to which blacks earn less than whites with the same observable skills because of
di⁄erences in unobserved skills or because of racial wage discrimination, whereby blacks
are paid less than identically productive whites.
Becker (1957) argues that taste-based discrimination, the disutility that white employers
attach to hiring black workers, can produce racial wage discrimination and that intensi-
￿ed product market competition can reduce this wage gap between identically productive
workers. With lower entry barriers, ￿rms with less of a taste for discrimination can initiate
pro￿table operations by hiring equally productive black workers at lower wage rates than
their white counterparts, boosting the relative demand for black workers. Thus, like any
ine¢ ciency, competition erodes racial wage discrimination.
Rather than emphasizing racial biases and competition, Arrow (1972) and Phelps (1972)
stress that a gap in skills and imperfect information can explain racial wage di⁄erentials.
If black workers are on average less productive than white workers due to characteristics
that are unobserved by employers, those employers will use the observable characteristic
￿race ￿as a signal of productivity. In turn, employers will pay blacks a lower wage rate
than whites with identical observable skills.
In this paper, we evaluate the causal impact of intensi￿ed competition on blacks￿relative
wages and assess whether the mechanisms linking competition and the racial wage gap are
consistent with a taste-based explanation of the racial wage gap. In particular, Becker￿ s
(1957) theory suggests that competition will increase the relative demand for black workers
only in economies where employers have a taste for discrimination. We examine this.
Indeed, we provide the ￿rst evaluation of whether the impact of competition on blacks￿
labor market opportunities varies positively with the economy￿ s taste for discrimination.
This provides information on whether competition diminishes the manifestation of racial
prejudices in labor markets.
Speci￿cally, we use bank deregulation to identify an exogenous intensi￿cation of com-
petition among non￿nancial ￿rms, and evaluate its impact on the racial wage gap in the
overall economy. From the mid-1970s to 1994, individual states of the United States re-
laxed restrictions on both the entry of banks from other states and the branching of banks
within states. The resultant intensi￿cation of competition among banks reduced ￿nan-
cial market imperfections and lowered entry barriers facing non￿nancial ￿rms. Black and
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deregulation substantively spurred the entry of new ￿rms. We assess whether this greater
competition among ￿rms boosted blacks￿relative wages. That is, we exploit the cross-state,
cross-time variation in bank deregulation to identify exogenous changes in entry barriers
facing non￿nancial ￿rms and then estimate whether the resultant intensi￿cation of com-
petition increases blacks￿relative wages. Critically, we do not focus on black￿ s relative
wages within the banking industry. Rather, we evaluate whether bank deregulation that
spurred competition in the entire economy reduced the racial wage gap in the state￿ s overall
economy.
Our estimation strategy requires that bank deregulation is exogenous to competition
and blacks￿labor market outcomes. Geographic restrictions on banking protected local
banks from competition for much of the 20th century (White, 1982). By the mid-1970s,
however, technological innovations reduced the economic advantages of these restrictions,
weakening the ability and desire of banks to ￿ght deregulation and triggering the disman-
tling of these statutes over the next two decades. Kroszner and Strahan (1999) show that
(1) the invention of automatic teller machines weakened the geographical bond between
customers and banks; (2) checkable money market mutual funds facilitated banking by
mail and telephone; and, (3) improvements in data processing, telecommunications, and
credit scoring techniques weakened the informational advantages of local bankers. These
national innovations interacted with preexisting state characteristics to produce consider-
able variation in the timing of bank deregulation across states. In states where probable
losers from deregulation, such as small banks, were politically powerful, deregulation oc-
curred later, while in states where probable winners from deregulation, such as small ￿rms,
were relatively powerful, deregulation occurred sooner. The timing of deregulation was nei-
ther associated with competition in the non￿nancial sector (Black and Strahan, 2002), nor,
as we demonstrate below, with the racial wage gap. Hence the history of bank deregulation
and its impact on entry barriers facing non￿nancial ￿rms provides a natural laboratory for
evaluating the causal impact of competition on blacks￿relative wages.
Our approach provides information on the mechanisms linking competition and rela-
tive wages by evaluating whether the impact of competition on the racial wage gap varies
by the degree of racial bias. According to Becker (1957), competition will boost blacks￿
relative wages only when the marginal employer receives disutility from hiring black work-
ers. Thus, we use interracial marriage rates prior to deregulation to proxy for cross-state
di⁄erences in the taste for discrimination. Using the 1970 census, we compute the pre-
dicted rate of intermarriage based on individual and state characteristics. We interpret
the di⁄erence between the predicted rate of intermarriage and the actual rate as positively
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measured prior to bank deregulation, (2) uncorrelated with the timing of bank deregula-
tion, and (3) strongly associated with recent survey measures of racial prejudices employed
by Charles and Guryan (2008). We use the racial bias index to evaluate whether the im-
pact of competition on blacks￿relative wages varies positively with the economy￿ s taste for
discrimination, as suggested by the taste-based view of racial wage discrimination. Econo-
metrically, di⁄erentiating by year, state, and taste for discrimination yields a quasi-triple
di⁄erence estimation framework that, as we explain below, allows us to relax standard
identi￿cation assumptions.
Employed with this framework, we turn to the data. Using individual-level data from
the Current Population Survey for survey years 1977 to 2007, state-level data on new
incorporations per capita to proxy for competition in the non￿nancial sector from Black
and Strahan (2002), data on married couples from the 1970s Census, and the dates of bank
deregulation from Kroszner and Strahan (1999), we evaluate the impact of deregulation
and competition on blacks￿relative wages.
The ￿ndings suggest that intensi￿ed competition substantially reduced racial wage dis-
crimination by ameliorating the manifestation of racial prejudices in labor markets. We
￿rst ￿nd that bank deregulation increased the rate of new incorporations across states with
di⁄erent values of the racial bias index. Dynamically, the impact of deregulation on the
rate of new incorporations grows over time. Second, bank deregulation increased blacks￿
relative wage rates, but only in "high racial bias" states. In states with above the median
level of the racial bias index, deregulation eliminated about one-third of the initial racial
wage gap after ￿ve years. Furthermore, the dynamic impact of deregulation on blacks￿
relative wages mirrors that of deregulation on new incorporations, with blacks￿relative
wages rising for many years following bank deregulation. Third, blacks￿relative wages are
positively associated with the rate of new incorporations in high racial bias states. Thus,
while bank deregulation boosted the rate of new incorporations in high and low racial bias,
there is a positive association between blacks￿relative wages and both bank deregulation
and new incorporations only in high racial bias states.
Moreover, the two-stage least squares results indicate that an exogenous intensi￿cation
of competition only boosted blacks￿relative wages in states with a su¢ ciently high taste
for discrimination. Using inter- and intrastate bank deregulation as instrumental variables
to identify exogenous shocks to the rate of new incorporations, we ￿nd that increases in
the rate of new incorporations only reduced the racial wage gap in high racial bias states,
such that a ten percent increase in the rate of new incorporations reduced the black-white
wage di⁄erential by 2.5 percent. Furthermore, exogenous increases in the rate of new
3incorporations also increased the relative working hours of black workers in high racial
bias states, consist with the interpretation that intensi￿ed competition boosted the relative
demand for black workers.
The ￿ndings do not simply imply that states with a high degree of racial bias converge
toward low racial bias states, nor that blacks￿relative wages increase over time. Rather,
among high racial bias states, exogenous increases in competition reduce the wage gap while
accounting for state and year ￿xed e⁄ects. The results, therefore, cannot be attributed to
convergence of blacks￿relative wages in high racial bias states toward those in other states
nor to any common time e⁄ects (business-cycles) among high racial bias states. Indeed, by
conditioning on state and year e⁄ects, we control for all national in￿ uences, such as federal
statutes, as well as state-speci￿c factors. The results imply that competition boosts blacks￿
relative wages by eroding the adverse e⁄ects of racial prejudices on the relative demand for
black workers.
To provide additional information on how competition shapes the impact of racial prej-
udices on labor markets, we also examine segregation. Becker￿ s (1957) theory predicts that
when employers are heterogeneous in both quality and taste for discrimination, black work-
ers will be hired by employers with the weakest racial prejudices, creating segregation in
the workforce. Moreover, the taste-based theory predicts that an intensi￿cation of product
market competition will reduce segregation. A lowering of entry barriers that allows new
employers with less of a taste for discrimination to enter the market increases the employ-
ment opportunities of black workers, reducing segregation. Thus, if our ￿ndings on blacks￿
relative wages re￿ ect the causal impact of competition on how racial prejudices a⁄ect la-
bor markets, then we should also observe greater integration following an intensi￿cation of
competition.
We examine this additional testable implication and ￿nd that an exogenous increase in
the rate of new incorporations reduced racial segregation across industries. To proxy for the
degree of segregation, we construct several measures of the degree to which each industry
is disproportionately composed of white workers or run by white managers. In high racial
bias states, we ￿nd that an increase in the rate of new incorporations sparked by bank
deregulation induced more blacks to work in industries that historically were composed
disproportionately of white workers or had a high proportion of white managers. These
￿ndings are fully consistent with the view that intensi￿ed competition reduced the e⁄ects
of racial prejudices on blacks￿relative wages and racial segregation.
This paper￿ s ￿ndings are robust to several potentially confounding in￿ uences. First, the
intensi￿cation of competition from bank deregulation could have increased blacks￿relative
wages by disproportionately helping occupations and industries with a comparatively high
4proportion of blacks, not by reducing the manifestation of racial prejudices on labor markets
(Black and Spitz-Oener, 2007). However, we ￿nd that blacks￿wages rise relative to compa-
rable white workers within the same occupation and industry. Second, bank deregulation
could trigger changes in the skill composition of the labor force through the selection of
workers into the labor force, interstate migration, and changes in self-employment (Butler
and Heckman, 1977; Mulligan and Rubinstein, 2008). We ￿nd no evidence that deregu-
lation substantively a⁄ected the relative skill composition of black workers. Third, bank
deregulation could have changed the prices of unobserved skills in which average black and
white workers are di⁄erentially endowed. Following Juhn, Murphy, and Pierce (1991), how-
ever, we ￿nd that bank deregulation improved black workers￿location throughout white
workers￿residual wage distribution, indicating that competition boosted blacks￿relative
wages in particular, not the relative wages of comparatively low income workers in general.
We are not the ￿rst to examine competition and discrimination. Becker (1957), Shep-
herd and Levin (1973), and Oster (1975) compare market concentration and relative wages
across industries, obtaining mixed results. Ashenfelter and Hannan (1986), however, stress
the importance of examining labor market integration, not relative wages, when comparing
industries or when examining an industry over time because relative wages are primarily
established in the overall economy, not in separate industries. Consistent with Becker￿ s
theory, they ￿nd a negative association between market concentration and the share of
female employees across several banking markets in Pennsylvania and New Jersey. In con-
trast to the Ashenfelter and Hannan (1986) approach, several studies trace the impact
of competition on relative wages within a single industry. Heywood and Peoples (1994)
and Peoples and Talley (2001) ￿nd that the deregulation of trucking increased the relative
wages of black workers. Black and Strahan (2001) ￿nd that bank deregulation increased
competition between banks, disproportionately reducing the rents paid to male workers
relative to female bank employees. Within manufacturing, Black and Brainerd (2004) ￿nd
that globalization intensi￿ed competition and thereby reduced the gender wage gap.
Our major contribution is that we provide the ￿rst evaluation of whether the impact of
an exogenous intensi￿cation of product market competition on blacks￿relative wages and
racial integration varies positively with the economy￿ s taste for discrimination. That is, we
not only assess whether competition boosts the relative demand for black workers in gen-
eral, we examine whether competition boosts blacks￿relative wages and integration only in
those environments in which the taste-based theory suggests that competition will enhance
blacks￿labor market opportunities. Toward this end, we use the rate of new incorporations
per capita as a measure of product market competition, rather than market concentra-
tion, because Becker (1957) identi￿es the entry of new ￿rms as the mechanism through
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fully consistent with the central implication of the taste-based theory: An intensi￿cation
of product market competition diminishes the manifestation of racial prejudices in labor
markets.
Our work complements Charles and Guryan￿ s (2008) study of the relation between
racial prejudices and blacks￿relative wages. Using state-level survey measures of racial
prejudices to gauge relative demand for black workers and the share of black workers in the
labor force, they provide the ￿rst empirical support for Becker￿ s (1957) hypothesis that a
stronger taste for discrimination by the marginal ￿rm reduces blacks￿relative wage rates.
Rather than evaluating the relation between racial prejudices at the margin and relative
wages, we examine the impact of changes in competition on changes in relative wage rates,
while distinguishing states by the taste for discrimination.
This paper also relates to research on ￿nance and income inequality (Levine, 2005; Beck,
Levine, and Levkov, 2009; Demirguc-Kunt and Levine, 2009). We show that exogenous
improvements in the functioning of banks substantively enhanced the economic opportuni-
ties of an historically disadvantaged group by diminishing the impact of racial prejudices
on labor market opportunities.
Our ￿ndings do not reject, and might even complement, statistical discrimination expla-
nations of racial wage di⁄erentials. Di⁄erences in productive skills might play an additional
role in explaining the racial wage gap. Indeed, Neal and Johnson (1996) explain a large
proportion of the racial wage gap using a measure of cognitive achievement. Heckman,
Stixrud, and Urzua (2006), however, warn that gaps in cognitive achievement scores could
re￿ ect the historical rami￿cations of racial prejudices, highlighting potential interactions
between statistical and taste-based theories. For example, competition that boosts blacks￿
relative wages might enhance incentives for blacks to acquire more skills. This would in-
crease the average skill level of blacks, potentially reducing statistical discrimination and
triggering self-reinforcing dynamics that reduce disparities in wages, education, and health
(Coate and Loury, 1993; Benabou, 1996; Card and Krueger, 1992; Durlauf, 1996, 2006;
Durlauf and Fafchamps, 2006; Jencks and Phillips, 1998; Altonji and Pierret, 2001; Fryer
and Levitt, 2004; Almond, Chay, and Greenstone, 2006).
In what follows, section 2 discusses the use of bank deregulation as an exogenous source
of variation in competition. Section 3 outlines the conceptual and statistical framework.
Section 4 describes the data and econometric design. Section 5 presents the core results
on relative wages, while Section 6 provide the results on racial integration. After providing
robustness tests in Section 7, Section 8 concludes.
62 Bank Deregulation and Competition
2.1 A Brief History of Bank Branch Regulation
Geographic restrictions on banks have their origins in the U.S. Constitution, which limited
states from taxing interstate commerce and issuing ￿at money. In turn, states raised
revenues by chartering banks and taxing their pro￿ts. Since states received no charter
fees from banks incorporated in other states, state legislatures prohibited the entry of out-
of-state banks through interstate bank regulations. To maximize revenues from selling
charters, states also e⁄ectively granted local monopolies to banks by restricting banks from
branching within state borders. These intrastate branching restrictions frequently limited
banks to operating in one city.
By protecting ine¢ cient banks from competition, geographic restrictions created a pow-
erful constituency for maintaining these regulations even after the original ￿scal motivations
receded. Indeed, banks protected by these regulations successfully lobbied the government
to prohibit interstate banking and intrastate branching (Southworth, 1928; White, 1982;
Economides, Hubbard, and Palia, 1996).
In the last quarter of the 20th century, however, technological, legal, and ￿nancial inno-
vations diminished the economic and political power of banks bene￿ting from geographic
restrictions. In particular, a series of innovations lowered the costs of using distant banks.
This reduced the monopoly power of local banks and weakened their ability and desire to
lobby for geographic restrictions. For example, the invention of automatic teller machines
(ATMs), in conjunction with court rulings that ATMs are not bank branches, weakened the
geographical link between banks and their clientele. Furthermore, the creation of check-
able money market mutual funds made banking by mail and telephone easier, thus further
weakening the power of local bank monopolies. Finally, the increasing sophistication of
credit scoring techniques, improvements in information processing, and the revolution in
telecommunications reduced the informational advantages of local bankers, especially with
regards to small and new ￿rms.
These national developments interacted with preexisting state characteristics to shape
the timing of bank deregulation across the states. As shown by Kroszner and Strahan
(1999), deregulation occurred later in states where potential losers from deregulation (small,
monopolistic banks) were ￿nancially stronger and had a lot of political power. On the
other hand, deregulation occurred earlier in states where potential winners of deregulation
(small ￿rms) were relatively numerous. Most states deregulated geographic restrictions on
banking between the mid-1970s and 1994, when the Riegle-Neal Act e⁄ectively eliminated
these restrictions.
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sector and the racial wage gap. The timing of deregulation was not shaped by new ￿rm
formation (Black and Strahan, 2002, Kerr and Nanda, 2009), nor by the strength of labor
unions (Black and Strahan, 2001), nor by the degree of earnings inequality (Beck, Levine,
and Levkov, 2009) in each state. Moreover, we show below that the racial wage gap does
not explain the timing of bank deregulation.
2.2 Bank Deregulation and Competition in the Non-Financial Sector
An extensive literature examines the rami￿cations of bank deregulation. For example, Ja-
yaratne and Strahan (1998) ￿nd that removing geographic restrictions improved banking
e¢ ciency by reducing interest rates on loans, raising them on deposits, lowering overhead
costs, and shrinking loan losses. Beyond banking, deregulation accelerated a state￿ s rate
of economic growth (Jayaratne and Strahan, 1996; and Huang, 2008), lowered economic
volatility (Demyanyk, Ostergaard, and Sorensen, 2007), improved the self-employment op-
portunities of disadvantaged groups (Demyanyk, 2008), and reduced income inequality
(Beck, Levine, and Levkov, 2009).
More speci￿cally for the purposes of this paper, inter- and intrastate bank deregulation
intensi￿ed competition among ￿rms in the non-￿nancial sector by reducing barriers to entry.
Black and Strahan (2002) ￿nd that deregulation helped entrepreneurs start new businesses,
with the rate of new incorporations per capita in a state increasing by six percentage
points following deregulation. Kerr and Nanda (2009) ￿nd that interstate deregulation
increased the number of new start-ups by six percentage points and expanded the number
of facilities of existing ￿rms by four percentage points across all sectors in the economy.
Furthermore, they ￿nd a dramatic increase in both the entry and exit of ￿rms, suggesting
that deregulation increased contestability throughout the economy.1 Below, we con￿rm that
inter- and intrastate bank deregulation boosted the rate of new incorporations per capita
and we use this to identify an exogenous, positive shock to competition in our analysis of
racial discrimination.
1Several interrelated factors explain the impact of deregulation on competition in the overall economy.
First, deregulation fueled competition among banks and reduced lending rates. This facilitated the expan-
sion of existing ￿rms and the entry of new ones. Furthermore, the country￿ s more innovative banks were
developing better techniques for evaluating ￿rms. Sophisticated credit-scoring techniques in conjunction
with dramatic advances in information processing enhanced the ability of banks to evaluate and ￿nance
new and small businesses. By easing the acquisition of banks across and within state boundaries, deregula-
tion helped spread these superior techniques for evaluating ￿rms (Hubbard and Palia, 1995). Deregulation
also permitted the formation of larger, more geographically diversi￿ed banks. Diamond￿ s (1984) theory of
intermediation suggests that greater diversi￿cation reduces the monitoring costs of lending to riskier, more
opaque ￿rms. Indeed, Berger et al. (1998) shows that small business lending increases after small banks
are acquired.
83 Conceptual and Statistical Framework
3.1 Conceptual Framework
Becker￿ s (1957) seminal analysis of racial discrimination and competition motivates our
empirical analysis. In Becker￿ s model, employers are heterogeneous in both quality and
￿ taste for discrimination,￿which is de￿ned as the degree to which they su⁄er "disutility"
from employing minority workers.2 In equilibrium, minority workers must ￿ compensate￿
employers either by being more productive at a given wage or by accepting a lower wage
for identical productivity. In turn, market pressures cause blacks to be hired by the least
racially biased employers. Thus, the joint distribution of employer taste for discrimination
and employer quality combine with the proportion of black workers in the economy to
in￿ uence the racial wage gap. For example, the racial wage di⁄erential will be larger
when all employers have a greater taste for discrimination, holding other things constant.
Similarly, the racial wage di⁄erential vanishes if employers receive no disutility from hiring
blacks. As a ￿nal example, an increase in the relative supply of black workers, holding
the distribution of existing ￿rms constant, will tend to widen the racial wage di⁄erential
as ￿rms with a stronger taste for discrimination are induced to hire black workers through
lower relative wage rates.
De￿ne racial discrimination as the percentage di⁄erence in the wage rates of identical
black and white workers, so that, the log hourly wage rates of black workers W B
st in economy
s during period t di⁄er from those of identical white workers W W






st ￿ ￿dst: (1)
In anticipation of examining the states of the United States, we use the subscript s to
designate an economy. Racial discrimination is not de￿ned as an economy￿ s attitude toward
minorities, though these tastes ￿these racial prejudices ￿in￿ uence the wage gap between
identical black and white workers.
In this framework, an increase in competition ￿a reduction in entry barriers ￿can reduce
the black-white wage rate di⁄erential. With lower entry barriers, new employers with less
of a taste for discrimination than incumbents can earn greater pro￿ts than existing ￿rms by
hiring equally productive black workers at lower wage rates than their white counterparts.
Thus, the lowering of entry barriers boosts the relative demand for black workers, eroding
2Bertrand and Mullainathan (2004) ￿nd that resumes with traditionally white names receive 50 percent
more calls for interviews than identical resumes with distinctively black names.
9the manifestation of racial prejudices on relative wage rates.3 Competition does not change
any individual￿ s preferences toward hiring minority workers. Rather, competition makes
racial wage discrimination more costly by facilitating the entry of employers with less of a
taste for discrimination.
The model further suggests that the marginal impact of competition on blacks￿relative
wage rates varies positively with the degree of racial prejudice in the economy. At the most
basic level, if employers have no taste for discrimination, then the racial wage gap equals
zero in the model. Under these conditions, competition does not a⁄ect black￿ s relative wage
rates. Competition only increases the relative wage rates of black workers in the model
when employers have a taste for discrimination.4
In turning toward an empirical assessment of the relationship between competition and
racial discrimination, we use the entry of new ￿rms as a proxy measure of competition. One
key advantage of new ￿rm entry as a proxy for competition, rather than more traditional
measures based on market share, is that Becker￿ s (1957) theory focuses on the actual entry
of new ￿rms: The entry of new ￿rms with di⁄erent tastes toward hiring minorities from
those of existing ￿rms reduces racial discrimination.
Furthermore, we (1) explicitly account for cross-state di⁄erences in the taste for dis-
crimination and (2) control for state and year ￿xed e⁄ects to hold other factors constant
that theory suggests a⁄ect the racial wage gap, such as cross-state di⁄erences in the racial
composition of the workforce. Thus, we evaluate whether the impact of competition on the
racial wage gap varies positively with the degree of racial bias in the economy.
3.2 Statistical Framework
We now outline a statistical framework for assessing the impact of competition on the racial
wage gap. Below, we de￿ne the construction of the actual data series and provide details
on the econometric methods.
Let W B
ist equal the log hourly wage rate of black worker i in state s in time t. Further,
de￿ne Rist as the relative wage rate of black worker i in state s in time t, which equals
the di⁄erence between the log hourly wage rate of black worker i (W B
ist) with observable
characteristics (XB
ist) and the wage rate of a white worker with identical observable traits
￿W
st (XB
ist). We call ￿W
st (XB
ist) the conditional wage rate of black worker i, where the condi-
3Note, perfect competition does not necessarily eliminate the black-white wage di⁄erential as argued
by Becker (1957). Depending on the joint distribution of ￿rm quality and taste for discrimination, an
equilibrium racial wage gap might still obtain with zero entry costs.
4One can conceive of distributions of existing employer quality and racial prejudices inconjunction with
particular distributions of the quality, racial prejudices, and entry barriers of shadow ￿rms, such that an
increase competition will not boost blacks￿relative wages. We evaluate this below.
10tioning is done on black worker i receiving the same wage rate as the average white worker
with identical observed characteristics in state s in time t (XB
ist).
For simplicity of illustration, yet without loss of generality, assume that states can be
divided into those with a high taste for discrimination and those where people do not receive
as much disutility from working and interacting with minorities. We allow the impact of
deregulation and competition on blacks￿relative wages to vary by a state￿ s degree of taste
for discrimination. Let Ts be a binary variable which is equal to one if the taste for
discrimination in state s is high and zero if it is low. We de￿ne the construction of this
racial bias index below.








ist) = ￿0Nst + ￿1NstTs + ￿s + ￿0t + ￿1t + "ist; (2)
where Nst denotes the entry of new ￿rms, which serves as a proxy for competition, in state
s in time t, Ts is zero-one racial bias index, ￿s is a vector of state ￿xed e⁄ects, ￿0t and ￿1t
are vectors of time e⁄ects in low and high racial bias states respectively, and "ist is an error
term composed of a person speci￿c idiosyncratic shock and any unobserved state-year ￿xed
e⁄ects. Note, this speci￿cation allows time e⁄ects to vary across high and low racial bias
states, so that ￿0t measures the time e⁄ect in low racial bias states and ￿1t measures the
time e⁄ect in high racial bias states. In terms of the parameter estimates on competition,
￿0 is the causal impact of competition on the relative wage rates of black workers in low
racial bias states, while ￿0 +￿1 is the e⁄ect of competition on the black-white wage gap in
high racial bias states.
Becker￿ s theory predicts that (1) competition boosts the relative wages of black workers
in states with a su¢ ciently high degree of racial bias, i.e., ￿0+￿1 > 0; and (2) the impact of
competition on blacks￿relative wages is larger in states with a higher degree of racial bias,
i.e., ￿1 > 0. Since the marginal employer might have a nonzero taste for discrimination
even in low racial bias states, our speci￿cation does not necessarily imply that ￿0 = 0, only
that ￿0 + ￿1 > 0 and ￿1 > 0.
4 Data and Econometric Design
4.1 Data
In this study we use micro-level and state aggregate data sources. For the micro-level
data on labor market characteristics, we use the Integrated Public Use Microdata Series
11(IPUMS) from the U.S. Current Population Survey (CPS), March Supplements for the
survey years 1977 to 2007 and the Census of Population for 1970, Form 1 State, and Form
2 State one-percent samples. These are combined with aggregate state level data on bank
deregulation, taken from Kroszner and Strahan (1999), and new incorporations as a proxy
for competition in the non￿nancial sector, which we obtained from Black and Strahan
(2002).
4.1.1 CPS Samples for the Years 1977 to 2007
The CPS March Annual Demographic Supplements provide information on earnings, along
with weeks and hours worked in the calendar year preceding the March survey so that
the 1991 survey provides information on earnings in 1990. We start in Survey year 1977
because that is when the CPS reports information on each person￿ s state of residence. To
enhance comparability and connect our analyses to the literature, we restrict our sample
to non-Hispanic white and black adult civilian males between the ages of 18 and 65 during
the working year, and exclude persons living in group quarters or with missing data on
relevant demographics. Our main wage sample further excludes the self-employed, persons
in the military, agricultural, or private household sectors, persons with inconsistent reports
on earnings, and individuals with allocated earnings.
We classify the adult population into six educational categories: (i) persons with 0￿ 8
years of schooling completed; (ii) high school dropouts; (iii) high school graduates, 12 years
of schooling; (iv) some college; (v) college graduate; and (vi) advanced degree. Potential
work experience is constructed as the maximum between zero and age (in year of survey)
minus years of schooling completed minus seven.
Wage rates are de￿ned as real annual earnings divided by the product of weekly working
hours and annual working weeks. We use the Consumer Price Index to de￿ ate earnings to
2000 dollars and set hourly earnings to missing if any of these components is missing or
zero. Following Autor, Katz, and Kearney (2008), workers with top coded earnings have
their annual earnings set to 1.5 times the annual top-code amount. We trim outliers with
hourly wages below the 1st percentile and above the 97th percentile of the year-speci￿c
distribution of hourly earnings of full-time, full-year workers. This trimming virtually
eliminates individuals with top-coded annual earnings. The results are robust to altering
the de￿nition of outliers. Finally, in accord with previous research on bank deregulation,
we drop Delaware and South Dakota from our analyses due to large concentration of credit
card banks in these states. Appendix Table 2 provides more details on the construction of
our sample.
124.1.2 The 1970 Census
We use the 1970 Census to construct information on the rate of racial intermarriage in
each state. The Census samples are the largest microdata set containing detailed marriage
and demographics information. Our primary sample includes married whites and blacks
between that ages of 18 to 65, and excludes couples in which at least one person is living in
group quarters or has missing data on race, gender, state of residence, marital status and
educational attainment.
4.1.3 State level data on bank deregulation and new incorporations
We obtain the dates of interstate and intrastate bank deregulation from Kroszner and
Strahan (1999) and Amel (2008). Most states removed these geographic restrictions on
banking between the mid-1970s and 1994, when they were eliminated by federal legislation.
Appendix Table 1 provides the deregulation dates for each state.
To measure new ￿rm entry, we use the rate of new incorporations per capita from Black
and Strahan (2002), who obtain these data from Dun and Bradstreet. Speci￿cally, we use
the log of new business incorporations per capita for each state over the period 1977-1994.
4.2 Generating Relative Wages and the Racial Bias Indexes
4.2.1 Relative wages
We ￿rst compute the estimated relative wage rate for each black worker i in the sample
( ^ Rist), which equals the worker￿ s actual wage rate minus the estimated wage rate that the
average white worker with identical characteristics would earn.
We follow a two-step procedure for computing the log hourly wage rate that a white
worker with identical characteristics as his black counterpart would earn. We ￿rst estimate







t + eist; (3)
where W W
ist is the log hourly wage of white worker i in state s during time t, Xist is
a vector of person-speci￿c observable determinants of log hourly wages (e.g., quartic in
potential experience, and six education categories), Xist also includes state ￿xed e⁄ects, eist
captures the component of wages idiosyncratic to white worker i. Equation (3) is estimated
separately for every year between 1976 and 2006. This yields time-varying returns, or
￿prices￿to observable characteristics, i.e., ￿
W
t . Further, the average value of unobservable
traits among white workers in state s during time t are incorporated into the estimation of
13(3) by the inclusion of state ￿xed e⁄ects in each of the 31 separate regressions. Below, we
analyze the potential biases induced by unobservable traits.
This ￿rst step has two noteworthy and crucial properties. First, given the changes in
the structure of wages in the United States since the mid 1970s (Katz and Autor, 1999),






to vary by year. This is crucial
for our analyses due to the well-documented skill gap between black and white workers.
Failure to account for time-varying returns to observables will lead to erroneous estimates
of the dynamic pattern of relative wages, potentially biasing our assessment of the impact
of competition on the black-white wage gap.
Second, by allowing state ￿xed e⁄ects to vary by year, we control for all time-varying,
state-speci￿c characteristics that might a⁄ect the wage rates of white workers including the
e⁄ect of bank deregulation. Speci￿cally, we include a vector of state dummy variables in (3),
which is estimated separately for each year. Thus, we control for the state￿ s unemployment
rate, its gross state product, changes in the industrial composition of production, the racial
composition of each state, state-level productivity di⁄erences, and regulatory reforms on
the wage rates of white workers. By controlling for these wage rate determinants in general,
we can more precisely focus on the impact of bank deregulation on blacks￿relative wages
in particular.
In some extensions, we also control for time-varying occupation- and industry-speci￿c
e⁄ects. To do this, we add a vector of occupation and/or industry dummy variables to
(3), which is estimated separately for each year. We use the three digit occupation and
industry codes recorded in the CPS, which are based on the 1950 Census Bureau classi-
￿cation system to provide a consistent set of industry and occupation codes throughout
the sample. This means including 408 additional dummy variables each year (144 indus-
tries and 262 occupations). While a worker￿ s occupation and industry could re￿ ect racial
wage discrimination, we condition on occupation and industry in robustness tests to assess
whether blacks￿wages change relative to white workers with the same observable skills,
who are working in the same occupation and industry.
In the second step, we generate the estimated relative wage rate of each black worker i
in state s during time t as the worker￿ s actual wage rate (W B
ist) minus the estimated wage









estimated parameters from (3):5







5To connect this to equation (2) of the statistical model, note that the estimated conditional wage rate












t ) is computed based on the following conditions: (1) each black worker￿ s
observable Mincerian characteristics (XB
ist) are rewarded at the same estimated prices (^ ￿
W
t )
as his white counterpart and (2) each black worker in state s during year t receives as part
of his wage rate the value of the unobservable traits of the average white worker in that
state and year.
4.2.2 Racial Bias Indexes
Becker￿ s (1957) theory implies that the impact of an intensi￿cation of competition on the
relative demand, and hence the relative wage rates, of black workers depends positively on
the taste for discrimination, holding other factors constant. We do not directly observe the
taste for discrimination. Consequently, we compute and use several estimates of the degree
of racial bias in each state.
We develop two types of racial bias indices based on the accumulated stock of racial
intermarriage in 1970. The "simple" racial bias index equals the di⁄erence between the
rate of intermarriage that would exist if married people were randomly matched and the
actual intermarriage rate. The random rate equals 2P ￿(1￿P), where P is the proportion
of blacks among the married population. Larger values of the simple racial bias index
indicate that intermarriage occurs less in practice than if marriage pairings were random.
We interpret larger values as (partially) re￿ ecting racial bias.
In the second type of racial bias index, we account for other factors that might induce
the actual rate of intermarriage to deviate from the random rate. Intermarriage depends on
the opportunities for interracial social contacts, so that the relative sizes of the black-white
populations might independently a⁄ect intermarriage (Blau, 1977). Furthermore, since
the odds of interethnic unions increase with couples￿educational attainment (Massey and
Denton, 1987; Qian, 1997; Rubinstein and Brenner, 2009), we also control for education
and age. Speci￿cally, based on the 1970s census, we estimate the following equation for all
married couples (excluding couples in which either the husband or wife is neither white nor
black) in the United States:
Iis = bHis + cWis + dSs + ￿is; (5)
where Iis equals one if couple i in state s is racially mixed and zero otherwise, His and
Wis are vectors of age and education characteristics for the two spouses respectively, Ss are
state characteristics, ￿is is the unexplained component of intermarriage, while b, c, and d
are coe¢ cients. Our benchmark speci￿cation conditions on nine categories of education,
along with age entered as a quartic. For state characteristics, we include the random inter-
15marriage rate de￿ned above along with the percentage of blacks among married couples.
We experimented with numerous speci￿cations, including and excluding the random inter-
marriage rate and the percentage of blacks, changing the speci￿cation of education and
age controls, and conditioning on metropolitan and urban locations. These combinations
produce the same conclusions.
From equation (5), we compute the intermarriage racial bias index for each state. Let
￿s equal the average value of ￿is across couples in state s. Recognizing that minf￿sg <
0,we compute the racial bias index as e Ts = ￿￿s + maxf￿sg, so that e Ts equals zero for
the state with the largest ￿s. We interpret large values as signaling a stronger taste for
discrimination. Appendix Table 3 provides the value of the racial bias index, e Ts; for each
state and the District of Columbia. Furthermore, Ts = 1 if e Ts ￿ medianfe Tsg, and Ts = 0
if e Ts < medianfe Tsg.
The intermarriage racial bias index is positively correlated with survey-based measures
of racial prejudice. Table 1 (Panel A) shows that the intermarriage racial bias index is
positively related to three survey-based measures of racial prejudice used by Charles and
Guryan (2008) in their study of relative wages and racial prejudices: (1) the fraction of
whites supporting a law against interracial marriage, (2) the fraction of whites would not
vote for a black president, and (3) the fraction of whites supporting the right to segregate
neighborhoods by race. Thus, the racial bias index based on intermarriage in 1970 is closely
associated with subjective measures of racial attitudes measured over the period 1972 to
2004.
The intermarriage racial bias index is negatively correlated with the relative wage rates
of black workers. Panel B of Table 1 shows that the intermarriage racial bias index is
strongly, negatively associated with black￿ s relative wage rates in the years prior to both
inter- and intrastate bank deregulation, suggesting that the racial bias index captures cross-
state di⁄erences in the relative demand for black workers.
As emphasized by Becker (1957), the relative supply of blacks in the workforce should
also a⁄ect the relative wage rate of black workers. We assess this prediction by including
the proportion of blacks in the workforce in 1970 in the relative wage rate regression. As
shown in Panel B of Table 1, states in which black workers compose ten percent or more of
the labor force tend to have low relative wage rates for black workers. The intermarriage
racial bias index, however, remains negatively and signi￿cantly associated with the relative
wage rate of black workers.
We also use the Charles and Guryan (2008) survey-based estimates of the degree of
racial prejudice of the marginal ￿rm in each state to categorize high- and low-racial bias
states. As shown in Panel B of Table 1, states with above the median levels of this marginal
16racial prejudice indicator have signi￿cantly lower relative wages of black workers. Nonethe-
less, the racial bias index based on racial intermarriage remains negatively and signi￿cantly
associated with blacks￿relative wages even when controlling for the marginal racial prej-
udice indicator and when controlling for both the marginal racial prejudice indicator and
the proportion of blacks in the workforce.
For the purposes of this paper, there are advantages to using the intermarriage racial
bias index rather than survey-based measures of racial attitudes. The intermarriage racial
bias index is based on actual choices made prior to deregulation not survey responses
made during the period of deregulation. Moreover, our empirical strategy requires that
the measure of racial bias is invariant to bank deregulation and the resultant change in
competition. If we di⁄erentiate states based on a measure of racial bias that itself re￿ ects
the e⁄ects of deregulation on the relative demand and supply of black workers, this will
confound our strategy of identifying the causal impact of product market competition on
the relative demand for black workers. The racial attitude surveys, however, are conducted
during the period of bank deregulation. Thus, the Charles and Guryan (2008) estimate of
the degree of racial prejudice of the marginal ￿rm, which is based on the racial attitude
surveys and the relative supply of black workers, includes the e⁄ects of bank deregulation
on product market competition. Although this is not a problem for their study of the
connection between the taste for discrimination of the marginal ￿rm and relative wage
rates, these survey-based measures are inappropriate for our purposes.
Furthermore, when assessing the impact of competition on blacks￿relative wages, Becker￿ s
(1957) framework advertises the advantages of our intermarriage racial bias index rather
than an estimate of the taste for discrimination of the marginal ￿rm, which incorporates
both the relative demand for and supply of black workers. Theory does not necessarily pre-
dict that an increase in competition will increase blacks￿relative wages more in states with
initially low relative black wage rates because low relative wage rates re￿ ect both demand
and supply. Rather, theory implies that an intensi￿cation of competition will increase the
relative demand for black workers only in states with a su¢ cient taste for discrimination.
Holding the relative supply of black workers constant, therefore, theory predicts that an
intensi￿cation of competition will increase blacks￿relative wages in states with a su¢ -
ciently high taste for discrimination. This is what we evaluate. We distinguish states by
their overall taste for discrimination, and assess whether competition boosts blacks￿relative
wage rates while conditioning on other state and year characteristics, including the relative
supply of black workers.
In sum, we include state and year ￿xed e⁄ects and evaluate whether an exogenous
increase in competition boosts the relative demand for black workers more in states with
17larger values of the intermarriage racial bias index. Measuring racial bias with error will
bias the results against ￿nding a statistically signi￿cant connection between racial bias,
competition, and the black-white wage gap. We do not require that the racial bias index is
a perfect measure of racial attitudes. We simply require that it provides some information
on racial prejudices across states.
4.3 Econometric Design
4.3.1 The impact of competition on blacks￿relative wages
To obtain a consistent estimate of the impact of competition, as measured by the rate of
incorporations, on relative wages, we need an instrumental variable that is correlated with
the rate of new incorporations but not independently correlated with blacks￿relative wages.
It is important to use instrumental variables because blacks￿relative wages could a⁄ect the
actual entry of ￿rms. For example, ￿rms could enter to exploit the opportunity to hire less
expensive labor in states with a large racial wage gap. If this occurs, OLS will underestimate
the causal impact of competition on blacks￿relative wages. Thus, to assess the causal
impact of competition on racial wage discrimination while di⁄erentiating economies by their
tastes for discrimination, our identifying strategy assumes that (i) banking deregulation is
exogenous to blacks￿relative wages, (ii) new incorporations per capita is a fair proxy for
competition, (iii) the racial bias index re￿ ects tastes for discrimination, and (iv) bank
deregulation does not a⁄ect the racial wage gap beyond its impact on the rate of new
incorporations.
From equations (2) and (4), the following second stage regression captures the causal
relationship of interest,
^ Rist = ￿0Nst + ￿1NstTs + ￿s + ￿0t + ￿1t + ￿ist; (6)
where the predicted value of the log of new incorporations per capita (Nst) is obtained from





st￿1Ts + ￿s + ￿0t + ￿1t + ￿st; (7)
where Dst is a vector indicating years since bank deregulation, Ts equals one in high racial
bias states and zero in low racial bias states, ￿0 and ￿1 are corresponding coe¢ cients, ￿s
is a vector of state-speci￿c e⁄ects, ￿0t and ￿1t represent time e⁄ects in low and high racial
6The ￿rst stage regression is conducted at the individual level, so it is weighted by the proportion of
black workers in each state.
18bias states respectively, ￿ist is an error term composed of a person speci￿c idiosyncratic
shock to relative wages and any unobserved state-year ￿xed e⁄ects, and ￿st is an error
term. The standard errors are clustered at the state-year level throughout the analyses. As
emphasized, we assess whether the impact of competition on the racial wage gap depends
on the degree to which states have a stronger or weaker taste for discrimination.
Our estimation strategy allows us to relax the standard exclusion restriction that bank
deregulation only a⁄ects blacks￿relative wages through its a⁄ect on the rate of new in-
corporations. We conduct a quasi triple di⁄erence estimation by including state and year
￿xed e⁄ects and by separately analyzing states with above and below the median value of
the racial bias index. This yields an estimate of the di⁄erential impact of an increase in
the rate of new incorporations on blacks￿relative wages in high and low racial bias states,
i.e., we assess whether ￿1 > 0. To obtain a consistent estimate of this di⁄erential impact
using 2SLS, we do not require the standard exclusion restriction to hold. Rather, we simply
require that any bias arising from bank deregulation a⁄ecting blacks￿relative wages beyond
its impact through the rate of new incorporations is the same in high and low racial bias
states, which we assess empirically below.7
4.3.2 Reduced form estimator
We also assess the reduced form impact of banking deregulation on black workers￿relative
wages by estimating the following wage equation using OLS:
7More formally with regard to the exclusion restriction, consider a modi￿ed version of equation (6) that
allows bank deregulation to a⁄ect blacks￿relative wages beyond new ￿rm entry (Nst):
^ Rist = ￿0Nst + ￿1NstTs + ￿s + ￿0t + ￿1t + D
0
st￿ + ￿ist
where ￿ re￿ ects the direct impact of bank deregulation on blacks￿relative wages. Using equation (7), it is
straightforward to show that:
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Under the standard exclusion restriction, bank deregulation has no direct impact on blacks￿relative
wages, ￿ = 0, so that 2SLS provides consistent estimates for ￿0 and ￿1.
However, even if bank deregulation in￿ uences blacks￿relative wages directly, 2SLS provides a consistent
estimate of ￿1as long as the impact of bank deregulation on the entry of new ￿rms is the same in high and
low racial bias states, i.e., if ￿1 = 0:
Moreover, if both ￿1 > 0 and ￿ > 0. 2SLS will underestimate the di⁄erential impact of competition
on blacks￿relative wages in high racial bias states, so that plim￿
2SLS
1 < ￿1. We evaluate both of these
conditions below.




st￿1Ts + ￿s + ￿0t + ￿1t + ￿ist; (8)
where ￿0 and ￿1 are coe¢ cients, ￿s is a vector of state ￿xed e⁄ects, ￿0t and ￿1t are vectors
of time e⁄ects in low and high racial states respectively, and ￿ist is an error term. For sim-
plicity, we use ￿s; ￿0t; and ￿1t as generic representations of state and year ￿xed e⁄ects, while
recognizing that the actual values will di⁄er across equations. In extensions of equation (8),
we assess the dynamic e⁄ects of deregulation on black workers￿relative wages by allowing
the relationship between relative wages and deregulation to vary by each year before and
after bank deregulation.
Although OLS produces unbiased estimates of the impact of bank deregulation on the
racial wag gap under standard identifying assumptions, including the assumption that
deregulation is uncorrelated with ￿ist, OLS does not necessarily identify a channel running
from competition to blacks￿relative wages. Identifying this channel motivates our use of
the two-stage least squares (2SLS).
Examining both the 2SLS and reduced form speci￿cations provides a more compre-
hensive assessment of the determinants of racial wage discrimination than using only one
method. If the rate of new incorporations is a sound proxy for competition and bank
deregulation is a valid instrument, then the 2SLS estimator provides information on the
causal impact of competition on blacks￿relative wage rates, putting aside for now the com-
plexities associated with accurately measuring the relative wage rates of equivalent black
and white workers. Yet, the reduced form analysis is independently valuable. It provides
information on whether bank deregulation disproportionately bene￿ted an historically dis-
advantaged group in the economy, expanding our understanding of the impact of ￿nancial
sector policies on the economy.
5 Results
5.1 Preliminaries
Our empirical analysis rests on the assumption that the cross-state timing of bank deregu-
lation was not a⁄ected by the racial wage gap. Figure 1 shows that neither the level of the
estimated wage gap before deregulation (Panel A) nor its rate of change prior to deregula-
tion (Panel C) explains cross-state di⁄erences in the timing of interstate bank deregulation.
Panels B and D of Figure 1 con￿rm these ￿ndings for the case of intrastate deregulation.
The size of the "bubbles" in the ￿gures represent the size of the black workforce in each
state, which corresponds to the weighting in the relative wage regressions below.
20Our strategy also requires that bank deregulation increases the rate of new incorpora-
tions in the overall economy. In Table 2, we show that both interstate bank deregulation
and intrastate branch deregulation exert a strong, positive impact on the log of new incor-
porations per capita over time. In columns (1) ￿ (3), we use simple dummy variables that
equal zero before a state deregulates and one afterwards. Interstate deregulation enters
signi￿cantly and positively, but intrastate does not, which is consistent with the ￿ndings
in Black and Strahan (2002).
The results in Table 2 emphasize that the positive impact of deregulation on the rate
of new incorporations grows over time. In columns (4) ￿ (6), we include the number of
years since deregulation and its quadratic. Interstate and Intrastate equal the number of
years since interstate and intrastate bank deregulation respectively, and equal zero before
deregulation. Both linear terms enter positively and signi￿cantly, while the quadratic terms
are negative, but the coe¢ cients are an order of magnitude smaller.8 Economically, the
coe¢ cients in columns (4) and (5) indicate that ￿ve years after either inter- or intrastate
deregulation the rate of new incorporations is about 10 percent greater than before dereg-
ulation. Furthermore, simultaneously deregulating inter- and intrastate restrictions boosts
the rate of new incorporations by 18 percent after ￿ve years as shown in column (6).
Figure 2 more fully illustrates the positive, dynamic impact of both interstate and
intrastate deregulation on the rate of new incorporations. In Figure 2, we trace out the year-
by-year relationship between both interstate and intrastate deregulation and the logarithm
of new incorporations. We do this for two samples of states, those with above the median
level of the racial bias index and those with below median levels. Speci￿cally,we report
estimated coe¢ cients from the following regression:
Nst = ￿ +￿1Inter￿9 +:::+￿18Inter+9 +￿1Intra￿9 +:::+￿18Intra+9 +￿s +￿t +"st; (9)
where Inter￿j equals one for the jth year before interstate deregulation, and Inter+k equals
one for the kth year after interstate deregulation, while Intra￿j equals one for the jth year
before intrastate deregulation, and Intra+k equals one for the kth year after intrastate
deregulation. These dummy variables equal zero in other years. We present results starting
9 years before each form of bank deregulation and trace out the year-by-year dynamics of
the relationship between deregulation and the wage gap until 9 years after each type of
bank deregulation. The year of deregulation is omitted and the regressions include state
(￿s) and year (￿t) ￿xed e⁄ects. After detrending the series, Figure 2 illustrates the level
and trend of the logarithm of new incorporations following each type of bank deregulation
8The impact of each form of deregulation on competition grows over time, reaching a maximum about
a decade after interstate deregulation, and over two decades after intrastate deregulation.
21relative to the level and trend before deregulation.9
There are three critical observations from Figure 2. First, interstate and intrastate
bank deregulation boost the rate of new incorporations. This is crucial since we use bank
deregulation to identify an exogenous intensi￿cation of competition.
Second, the impact of bank deregulation on the rate of new incorporations is not im-
mediate. The e⁄ect of bank deregulation on the rate of new incorporations is still growing
after ￿ve years. If bank deregulation a⁄ects blacks￿relative wages by increasing the rate of
new incorporations, therefore, we should also ￿nd that the dynamic impact of deregulation
on black￿ s relative wages materializes over time.
Third, the positive impact of inter- and intrastate bank deregulation on the rate of new
incorporations occurs in both states with above the median level of the racial bias index
and in states with below the median level of the racial bias index. The the marginal impact
of intrastate deregulation on the rate of new incorporations in low racial bias states is less
pronounced than in high racial bias states.10 Though the impact of bank deregulation on
new incorporations does not have to be identical in high and low racial bias states, our
empirical strategy requires that deregulation boosts the rate of new incorporations in both
high and low racial bias states because we propose to evaluate whether the marginal impact
of an exogenous increase in competition is greater in high racial bias states.
5.2 Bank Deregulation and Blacks￿Relative Wages
5.2.1 Reduced Form Analyses of Bank Deregulation
We next assess the reduced form impact of Interstate and Intrastate on the relative wage




. For each form of deregulation, we present three speci￿cations.
First, blacks￿ relative wages are regressed on bank deregulation using the full sample.
Second, we add an interaction term of deregulation and the racial bias dummy for each
state, which equals one if the value of the racial bias index is greater than or equal to the
sample median and zero otherwise. As suggested by theory, the impact of competition-
enhancing bank deregulation on blacks￿relative wages should be greater in more racially
biased states. Third, rather than include an interaction term, we split the sample by the
median value of the racial bias index, which allows the coe¢ cients on state and year ￿xed
9Speci￿cally, we compute the trend in the coe¢ cients on the dummy variables on bank deregulation prior
to deregulation. We then detrend the entire series of estimated coe¢ cients based on the pre-deregulation
trend. The resulting ￿gure illustrates the level and trend of the logarithm of new incorporations after bank
deregulation relative to the patterns before deregulation.
10As developed in footnote (7), when bank deregulation has a larger e⁄ect on the rate of new incorpo-
rations in high racial bias states, the 2SLS estimator will tend to underestimate the di⁄erential impact of
the rate of new incorporations on blacks￿relative wages in high versus low racial bias states.
22e⁄ects to di⁄er across the two subsamples. Throughout the analyses, we include state and
year ￿xed e⁄ects.
Table 3 shows that bank deregulation has a large, signi￿cant impact on the relative
wage rates of black workers in states with su¢ ciently high values of the racial bias index.
In the regressions including the interaction of deregulation with the racial bias dummy,
the impact of deregulation on blacks￿relative wages is increasing in the state￿ s racial bias
index. The results hold for both inter- and intrastate bank deregulation. When splitting
the sample between high and low racial bias states, the results indicate that a drop in entry
barriers triggers a bigger increase in the relative demand for black workers in more racially
biased economies.
Furthermore, by splitting the sample between high and low racial bias states, we employ
a quasi-triple di⁄erence speci￿cation. In particular, there might be concerns that even
though bank deregulation di⁄ers in its timing across states, there might be a confounding
factor that reduces racial discrimination and is coincident with the state-speci￿c timing
of bank deregulation. By showing that bank deregulation only increases blacks￿relative
wages in high racial bias states as predicted by theory, this reduces the possibility that an
unobserved state-year e⁄ect is driving the results, and it is fully consistent with the view
that intensi￿ed competition reduces the manifestation of racial prejudices in labor market
outcomes.
The estimated reduction in the racial wage gap from bank deregulation is economi-
cally meaningful. Consider column (4) of Table 3, which provides the regression results for
states with above the median value of the racial bias index. Among these states, deregula-
tion boosts the wage rates of black workers by 6 percentage points more than their white
counterparts after ￿ve years (6 = 0:012 ￿ 5 ￿ 100). Since the average racial wage gap in
these high-bias states was 20 percent in 1976, the results suggest that interstate deregula-
tion eliminates almost 30 percent of the initial racial wage gap. The results are virtually
identical when using Intrastate, as shown in column (8).
5.2.2 Dynamic Analysis of the E⁄ect of Bank Deregulation
We next illustrate the dynamic relation between bank deregulation and the relative wages of
blacks. In Figure 3, we trace out the year-by-year relationship between deregulation and the
wage gap by including a series of dummy variables in equation (8) for inter- and intrastate
deregulation respectively. Speci￿cally, D￿j equals one for the jth year before deregulation,
and D+k equals one for the kth year after deregulation. These dummy variables equal zero
in other years. The year of deregulation is omitted and the regressions include state and
year ￿xed e⁄ects.
23In examining the dynamic impact of deregulation on the racial wage gap, we use two
samples of states. In Panel A of Figure 3, the subsample includes states with above the
median values of the racial bias index. Panel B reports the dynamic relation between the
relative wage rates of black workers and bank deregulation for the subsample of states with
below the median values. The dashed line reports the estimated coe¢ cients on the interstate
deregulation dummy variables, while the solid line provides the estimated coe¢ cients on
the intrastate deregulation dummy variables.
Three crucial messages emerge from Figure 3. First, the impact of both interstate and
intrastate bank deregulation on blacks￿relative wages is much greater in states where the
racial bias index is above the median than in states with lower values of the racial bias
index. For example, the impact of interstate bank deregulation on blacks￿relative wages
rises over time in states with high values of the racial bias index, while interstate bank
deregulation has virtually no e⁄ect on relative wage rates in states with low values of the
racial bias index. Second, there is no evidence that trends or innovations in the wage gap
precede either interstate or intrastate bank deregulation. Rather, blacks￿relative wages
rise after bank deregulation for an extensive period in states with high values of the racial
bias index. Third, the impact of deregulation on black￿ s relative wages grows over time.
This is consistent with the dynamics of the relationship between deregulation and the rate
of new incorporation documented in Figure 2 and Table 2.
While demonstrating the powerful impact of bank deregulation on the racial wage gap,
these results do not provide direct evidence on the underlying causal mechanisms. We now
examine the relationship between the rate of new incorporations and blacks￿relative wages
to assess whether, and under which conditions, an exogenous increase in the rate of new
incorporations reduces the black-white wage gap.
5.3 Competition and Blacks￿Relative Wages
5.3.1 Reduced Form Analyses of Competition
In examining the relationship between competition and the racial wage gap, we begin with
reduced form OLS regressions. In Table 4, the dependent variable is blacks￿relative wages ￿
^ Rist
￿
. The key regressor is the log of new incorporations per capita, which we use as a
proxy for competition. The estimation is conducted on the full sample, and we also split
the sample into states with below and above the median level of the racial bias index.
In Panel A, we use the benchmark measure of blacks￿relative wages, which is computed
while conditioning on the standard Mincerian characteristics, education and potential work
experience. In Panel B, we use an alternative measure of blacks￿relative wages that also
24conditions on occupation, as discussed above.
There is a strong, positive association between the rate of new incorporations and the
relative wages of black workers in states with above the median values of the racial bias
index (column 3). The OLS estimates indicate that ten percent increase in the rate of new
incorporations is associated with a 1.4 percent increase in blacks￿relative wages in high
racial bias states. In contrast, there is no relationship between the wage gap and our proxy
for competition in states with low values of the racial bias index (column 2). These results
hold both when using the benchmark, Mincerian measure of blacks￿relative wages (Panel
A) and also when conditioning on occupation (Panel B).
5.3.2 2SLS Analyses of Competition
The ￿nal six columns of Panel A and Panel B of Table 4 report 2SLS estimates, where
two di⁄erent sets of instrumental variables are used to identify changes in the rate of new
incorporations. First, the "linear" instruments simply include Interstate and Intrastate.
Second, the "Non-Parametric" instruments included dummy variables for each year before
and after both interstate and intrastate deregulation. These instruments are drawn from the
analyses reported above in Table 2 and Figure 3. Furthermore, in reported robustness tests,
we ￿nd that using Interstate and Intrastate plus their quadratic terms as instruments
produces similar results.
As shown, the instrumental variables pass the validity tests. They signi￿cantly explain
new incorporations as shown by the F-test of the excluded instruments. Furthermore, the
instruments pass the test of the over-identifying restrictions (OIR test), meaning that the
hypothesis that the instruments only a⁄ect blacks￿relative wages through their e⁄ect on
new incorporations is not rejected.11
The exogenous increase in the rate of new incorporations dramatically boosted the wage
rates of black workers relative to their white counterparts in states with above the median
values of the racial bias index. As reported in columns (6) and (9) of both Panels A and
B, an acceleration of the rate of new incorporations increased blacks￿relative wages in high
racial bias states. In contrast, the results in columns (5) and (8) indicate that a faster
rate of new incorporations did not increase blacks￿relative wages in states with below the
median values of the racial bias index.
11In unreported robustness tests, we also show that the results are not driven by states in which deregu-
lation did not induce an increase in competition, which would run counter to theory and our identi￿cation
strategy. Thus, we run the ￿rst-stage regression while omitting each state one-at-a-time. We then ￿nd
which states are "￿ attening" the estimated relationship between competition and deregulation in the ￿rst
stage. When we eliminate these states, the results strengthen. This robustness test suggests that the e⁄ects
of deregulation on racial discrimination are driven by states in which the "treatment" is a⁄ecting product
market competition, not by some spurious channel.
25The economic impact the rate of new incorporations on blacks￿relative wages is large in
states with above the median level of the racial bias index. With either set of instrumental
variables, the estimates indicate that a ten percent acceleration in the rate of new incor-
porations increases blacks￿relative wages by about 2.5 percent in high racial bias states.12
Combining these results with those in Figure 2, the results suggest that bank deregulation
boosted the rate of new incorporations by over 20% after ￿ve years in high racial bias
states, which in turn increased blacks￿relative wages by about ￿ve percent in these same
states. These estimates indicate that by increasing competition, bank deregulation boosted
blacks￿relative wages by one-quarter of the initial racial wage gap in these states, which
equaled, on average, 20 percent in the years before bank deregulation.
5.3.3 Competition and Blacks￿Relative Wages: Sensitivity Analyses
The results are robust to using either the Charles and Guryan (2008) measure of racial
prejudices (CG) or the intermarriage racial bias index (LLR) to categorize states as high- or
low-racial bias states. Table 5 presents the OLS and 2SLS analyses of the relation between
the racial wage gap and the rate of new incorporations. We use the linear instrument set and
compute blacks￿relative wages conditional on standard Mincerian traits and occupation.
We use a common sample of states that is slightly smaller than in Table 4 because the CG
measure is unavailable for Hawaii, Idaho, Maine, Nebraska, Nevada, and New Mexico.
The strong positive impact of the rate of new incorporations on blacks￿relative wages
is robust to using the CG racial prejudice indicator to classify states. In states with above
the median values of the two racial bias indicators, the log of new incorporations per capita
is positively associated with blacks￿relative wages.
Figure 4 shows that the results are robust to considering the full range of possible
combinations of (1) estimation strategy (OLS and 2SLS), (2) method for computing blacks￿
relative wages (either conditioning on standard Mincerian controls (R) or also conditioning
on occupation (Ro)), (3) method for categorizing states by taste for discrimination (LLR
or CG), and (4) using linear or non-parametric instrumental variables (Linear or Non ￿
param:). Figure 4 plots each point estimate along with its 95% con￿dence interval. As
shown, the results are robust. In terms of the instrumental variable results, there is only
one speci￿cation in which the rate of new incorporation does not enter positively and
signi￿cantly at the ￿ve percent level, and instead enters with a p-value of (0:10). This
exception involves using the CG indicator to de￿ne racial attitudes, and we have already
12The 2SLS parameter estimate is larger than the OLS estimate. This is consistent with the reverse
causality argument made above. Speci￿cally, if ￿rms are attracted to states where blacks￿relative wages
are particularly low, OLS will underestimate the impact of a lowering of entry barriers on blacks￿relative
wages.
26discussed the advantages, in the context of our particular study, of using the intermarriage
racial bias measure (LLR).
6 The E⁄ect of Competition on Segregation
6.1 Racial Prejudices, Competition, and Segregation
Besides making predictions regarding relative wages, Becker￿ s (1957) taste-based theory
of discrimination also predicts that when employers are heterogeneous in both productive
quality and the "disutility" they receive from employing black workers, there will be racial
segregation as black workers are hired by the least racially biased employers. Indeed, if ￿rms
are similar except for the racial prejudices of employers, segregation will reduce racial wage
di⁄erentials as workers sort according to the racial preferences of employers. This led Welch
(1975) to emphasize the segregation prediction of the taste-based theory of discrimination.
While racial wage di⁄erentials are a fundamental measure of labor market discrimination
and the focus of our examination, segregation o⁄ers an additional margin along which to
assess whether the relations between competition and the racial characteristics of labor
markets are consistent with the taste-based theory.
More speci￿cally, the taste-based theory suggests that an intensi￿cation of competition
will reduce segregation. Lowering entry barriers allows new employers with less of a taste for
discrimination than existing employers to enter. This increases the number of employers
willing to hire black workers at prevailing wage rates. By expanding the employment
opportunities of blacks, competition will reduce segregation. If our earlier results on blacks￿
relative wages re￿ ect the causal impact of intensi￿ed competition on how racial prejudices
a⁄ect labor markets, then we should also observe a reduction in segregation following an
intensi￿cation of competition.
6.2 The E⁄ect of Competition on Segregation: Results
In light of this testable implication, we turn back to the data and evaluate the impact of
an intensi￿cation of competition on the racial allocation of workers while di⁄erentiating
states by the degree of racial prejudice. To analyze the same time period and workers used
in our examination of blacks￿relative wages, we study the racial composition of workers at
the industry level, using data on the 144, 3-digit industry categories in the CPS. If there
are cross-industry di⁄erences in the racial prejudices of employers, then the taste-based
theory predicts that competition will expand the cross-industry labor market opportunities
available to black workers and induce blacks to move to industries that were previously
27dominated by whites. While one may question whether the racial prejudices of employers
di⁄er by industry, Becker (1957) provides an economic rational for examining segregation at
the industry level: competition may di⁄er by industry. If there are cross-industry di⁄erences
in entry barriers, and hence competition, employers with stronger racial prejudices will have
comparatively greater success in less competitive industries holding other factors constant.
Thus, while the keystone of our analysis is blacks￿relative wages, racial integration across
industries provides additional evidence on the mechanisms linking competition and racial
discrimination in labor markets.
Consequently, we construct and use several measures of the extent to which an industry
is particularly "white." First, we calculate the share of white workers by industry. Sec-
ond, since the racial composition of workers in an industry might simply re￿ ect the human
capital needs of the industry in conjunction with the di⁄erential racial composition of hu-
man capital skills, we also estimate the degree to which the proportion of white workers
in an industry is greater than the proportion explained by the underlying characteristics
of workers. To do this, we regress (for each year) the proportion of white workers in each
of the 144 industries on the characteristics of the white workers in that industry, including
education, a quartic in potential experience, as well as occupation and state ￿xed e⁄ects,
i.e., the same set of regressors that we employ to generate wage residuals. We collect the
average residuals in each industry. These provide crude and residual ("unexplained") mea-
sures of the "whiteness" of each industry. Third, motivated by Ashenfelter and Hannan
(1986), we calculate the proportion of white managers in each industry and use this propor-
tion as a measure of the degree to which an industry is dominated by whites. Fourth, we
also construct the unexplained proportion of white managers, using the same conditioning
regressors.
We next estimate the impact of competition on the racial composition of the industry
in which each black worker is employed. We use the same speci￿cation employed in our
relative wage regressions, except the dependent variable is one of the measures of the
"whiteness" of the industry in which each black works. Thus, we regress industry whiteness
on the log of new incorporations per capita, controlling for state and year ￿xed e⁄ects.
We do this using OLS and 2SLS. We divide states by the degree of racial bias, using
both the LLR and CG measures of racial bias to categorize states. Thus, we evaluate
whether an exogenous increase in competition induces black workers to move to "white"
industries, while di⁄erentiating states by racial bias. In the analyses, we obtain the same
results whether we use the crude or residual measures of the degree to which an industry
is composed of white workers or managers. For simplicity, we present the results for the
unexplained proportion of white workers and the crude measure of the fraction of white
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Consistent with the taste-based theory, Table 6 indicates that an acceleration of the
rate of new incorporations in high racial bias states induced blacks to work in "whiter"
industries. These results hold when examining (1) the unexplained proportion of white
workers and (2) the proportion of white managers. The results hold when using OLS or
2SLS, and whether we divide states by the LLR or the CG indicator of racial prejudices.
The sizes of the estimated coe¢ cients suggest that the impact of new incorporations on
the reallocation of black workers across industries is economically small, but not inconse-
quential. For instance, consider the sample of high racial bias states based on the racial
bias index (LLR) and the results using the proportion of white managers. The estimated
coe¢ cient indicates that a one standard deviation increase in the log of new incorporations
per capita (0.4) boosts the proportion of white managers in which the average black worker
is employed by 0.0032 (0.4*0.08), which is almost one-tenth of the cross-industry standard
deviation of white managers (0.04). In sum, the ￿ndings are consistent with the view that
intensi￿ed competition reduced racial segregation in the workforce.
6.3 Competition and Blacks￿Relative Wages Within Industries
Given this ￿nding on the movement of black workers to historically white industries, we
were concerned that the earlier results on blacks￿relative wages could re￿ ect a shift of
black workers to better paying industries, rather than an increase in blacks￿relative wages
within industries. To assess whether the shift of black workers to white industries accounts
for the increase in blacks￿relative wages, we evaluate the impact of an increase in the
rate of new incorporations on blacks￿relative wages, where we not only compute blacks￿
relative wages by conditioning on education, potential experience, and occupation, but
also by conditioning on industry. As noted above, we recognize the problems with this
conditioning since an individual￿ s industry could be endogenously explained by the rate of
new incorporations. Nonetheless, as a robustness check, we compare the wages of black
workers with the same observable traits as their white counterparts who are working in the
same industry and the same occupation to see whether the relation between the rate of
new incorporations and blacks￿relative wages is accounted for by the movement of black
workers to higher paying industries.
The results in Table 7 suggest that the intensi￿cation of competition boosted blacks￿
wages relative to comparable white workers within the same industry and occupation.
Increased racial integration does not fully account for the increase in blacks￿relative wages
following the boost in the rate of new incorporations. Both results ￿the increase in blacks￿
relative wages and the increase in racial integration in the workplace ￿are consistent with
29the taste-based view of racial discrimination.
7 Robustness Checks
In this section, we address concerns about several factors that could confound our ability
to draw accurate inferences about the impact of competition on racial wage discrimination.
Some of these factors work against the reported ￿ndings, leading us to underestimate the
bene￿cial e⁄ects of bank deregulation and the rate of new incorporations on blacks￿relative
wages. In these cases, we simply discuss our robustness tests without presenting tables.
Other factors either play a central role in Becker￿ s (1957) theory or potentially lead us to
overestimate the impact of competition on racial discrimination. In these cases, we present
correspondingly more information.
7.1 Relative Hours Worked
We were concerned that blacks￿relative wages could also rise if deregulation induced the
labor supply curve of black males to shift leftward. If this occurs, the working hours of
blacks could actually fall after deregulation relative to those of whites.
Table 8 reports the e⁄ects of bank deregulation and the log of new incorporations
per capita on the relative working hours of blacks in high racial bias states using two
approaches. We examine high racial bias states because this is where the rate of new
incorporations increased blacks￿relative wages. In the ￿rst approach, we trace the impact
of bank deregulation, through the rate of new incorporations, to blacks￿relative wages. We
then examine the impact of these projected relative wages on blacks￿relative annual hours
worked. If an outward shift in the demand curve is causing the increase in blacks￿relative
wages, then we expect to ￿nd a positive coe¢ cient on blacks￿relative wages in the relative
working hours regression.
In the second approach, we examine the impact of the log of new incorporations per
capita on the relative working hours of blacks without tracing the e⁄ect through relative
wages. Speci￿cally, we reproduce the 2SLS analyses in Table 4 except that the dependent
variable is the di⁄erence between the actual number of hours worked of each black worker
and the projected annual hours worked of a white worker with identical traits. The di⁄er-
ence between the actual and projected hours worked re￿ ects the racial gap in hours. We
use bank deregulation to identify an exogenous increase in new incorporations and assess
the impact on this gap in working hours.
To compute relative working hours, we ￿rst estimate a labor supply equation every
year on a sample of white males, while conditioning on state ￿xed e⁄ects and the same
30Mincerian characteristics used in the wage equation. Then, we use the resulting coe¢ cient
estimates to calculate the predicted number of hours worked of a white worker with each
black worker￿ s characteristics. Finally, we compute the relative working hours of each black
worker as the di⁄erence between his actual and predicted working hours.
Since there is a meaningful kink in the labor supply curve between working and not
working, we use both OLS and Tobit speci￿cations and also examine the subsample of
blacks with positive working hours. We use a standard bootstrapping procedure to correct
the standard errors since the regressors are estimated.
We ￿nd that bank deregulation that increased the rate of new incorporations and
boosted blacks￿relative wages also increased the relative working hours of blacks. The
evidence suggests that bank deregulation increased the relative demand for black work-
ers. As shown, the impact is particularly pronounced among workers. This suggests that
while deregulation increased the relative demand for black workers, bank deregulation did
not signi￿cantly attract new black workers into the workforce. Most important given the
focus of this paper, the Table 8 results clearly demonstrate that bank deregulation and
competition did not shift black￿ s labor supply curve to the left.
7.2 Selection, Migration, and Self-Employment
We were concerned that changes in the skill composition of black males in the economy could
a⁄ect our evaluation of blacks￿relative wages. Consequently, we calculate the projected
wage rates for all working age (non-institutionalized) blacks in each state, whether they are
working or not. We do this using the estimated returns to observable traits from equation
(3) and using the actual traits of each black male. In this way, we compute the value of
observable traits of all black males. Then, we evaluate the impact of bank deregulation on
the composition of skills in the workforce.
Table 9 provides regression results of the projected wage rates of all relevant black
males on a dummy variable if the person works, Interstate, and the interaction between
Interstate and the dummy variable for working or not, as well as state and year ￿xed
e⁄ects. There are similar regressions for Intrastate. The summation of the coe¢ cients
on Interstate and the interaction term provide information on whether the average value
of the traits of workers changes after deregulation. The coe¢ cient on Interstate provides
information on the change in the average value of the traits of individuals who are not
working following deregulation.
Deregulation did not have a signi￿cant e⁄ect on the average value of the traits of
black workers. There is no evidence that bank deregulation substantively a⁄ected the skill
composition of black workers. To the extent that observable traits are correlated with un-
31observable characteristics, these results further imply that the composition of unobservable
traits did not change much following bank deregulation.
Deregulation could also a⁄ect migration across states. To assess this, we estimate the
e⁄ect of deregulation on the fraction of black males within states. We ￿nd that the share
of black males within states increased slightly after deregulation. This is consistent with a
situation in which deregulation boosted the rate of new incorporations, reduced the racial
wage gap, and attracted blacks from other states. Yet, as shown in Table 9, the net
compositional changes of blacks in the economy due to deregulation did not have much of
an e⁄ect on the skill composition of working blacks. There is no indication that migration
leads us to overstate the bene￿cial e⁄ects of deregulation.
Similarly, the boost in blacks￿relative wages could attract black males with compara-
tively low unobserved skills into the labor force, leading us to underestimate the degree to
which the rate of new incorporations reduces racial wage di⁄erentials. A quantile regression
at the median helps in assessing the importance of this potential bias by putting less weight
on entrants of black workers with low unobserved skills.
We ￿nd no evidence that selection based on unobservables is causing us to underestimate
the true e⁄ect of the rate of new incorporations. While the log of new incorporations per
capita increases the relative demand for black workers, the number of new black males
pulled into the labor force is relatively small, such that the median regression yields virtually
identical results to the OLS coe¢ cient estimates.
7.3 Swimming Upstream
Biases could arise from changes in the "prices" of unobserved skills. Although national
trends in returns to unobserved skills will not a⁄ect our results because we control for
year ￿xed e⁄ects, the intensi￿cation of competition when a state deregulates could increase
returns to unobservable traits. If the average white worker has more of these unobserved
traits than the average black worker, the average wage rate of whites will rise relative to
that of blacks. This e⁄ect will cause the estimated value of blacks￿relative wages to fall,
even though racial discrimination is not rising.
Under these conditions, we will underestimate the true, positive e⁄ect of deregulation
on the relative wages of blacks. This is sometimes called ￿swimming upstream￿ (Juhn
Murphy and Pierce, 1991; Blau and Kahn, 1997; Blau and Kahn, 2000; and Mulligan
and Rubinstein, 2008). To assess the importance of swimming upstream, we follow the
literature and use quantile regressions. The goal is to compare black and white workers
that are more similar in unobserved skills than when using OLS, which compares averages
from both groups.
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that we are underestimating the bene￿cial e⁄ects of bank deregulation on blacks￿relative
wages when using OLS. The median regressions produce similar coe¢ cient estimates to
those from OLS. Moreover, in moving from lower quantiles to higher quantiles, we ￿nd
that deregulation reduced a larger proportion of the racial wage gap. Under the assumption
that the average white has more unobserved skills than the average black, these ￿ndings
are consistent with the view that the racial wage gap closed more among white and black
workers with comparable unobserved skills.
7.4 Racial Discrimination or the Poor
Since bank deregulation exerts a disproportionately positive impact on the poor and blacks
are on average comparatively poor (Beck, Levine, and Levkov, 2009), the current paper￿ s
analyses could re￿ ect this income distributional e⁄ect, rather than the impact of bank
deregulation and competition on blacks in particular.
Three observations, however, suggest that this is not the case. First, bank deregulation
and the rate of new incorporations boosted blacks￿relative wages in states with a high
degree of racial bias. This is di¢ cult to reconcile with the view that our results simply
re￿ ect a tightening of the distribution of income. Second, the results hold when computing
relative wages conditional on occupation and industry. Thus, our ￿ndings indicate that even
within low-paying (and high-paying) occupations and industries, blacks￿relative wages rose
with competition.
Third, and most directly, we perform a rank analysis and compare the change in blacks￿
relative wages with those of comparable whites across the full distribution of relative wage
rates. If deregulation is simply helping the poor, we should not see that blacks converge
toward whites at each point in the wage distribution.
The results show that bank deregulation, and the accompanying boost in the log of new
incorporations per capita, disproportionately helped black workers across the full distrib-
ution of wages. Figure 5 shows the rank plot for the high racial bias states, and for the
sample of states with below the median level of the racial bias index. The solid and dashed
lines represent the location of blacks within the conditional log hourly wage distribution of
whites before and after deregulation respectively. The median black among the high racial
bias states, for example, corresponds to the 28th percentile white worker prior to deregula-
tion and the 32nd percentile white work after deregulation. The median black, therefore,
gained four ranks in the white wage distribution as a result of deregulation, but only in
high racial bias states. Consistent with the earlier results, there is little change in relative
wage rates in the low racial bias states. These results suggest that deregulation exerted a
33particularly pronounced e⁄ect on black workers.
8 Conclusions
In this paper, we examine whether an increase in product market competition reduced
the manifestation of racial prejudices in labor markets. As Becker (1957) argued, taste-
based discrimination by employers can (1) produce an equilibrium gap between the wages
of identical black and white workers and (2) produce racial segregation in the workforce.
He further stressed that greater competition could erode the racial wage gap by reducing
the impact of racial prejudices on the relative demand for black workers and reduce racial
segregation by increasing the number of employers willing to hire black workers. A central
implication of the taste-based discrimination theory is that greater competition will reduce
the black-white wage di⁄erential and increase racial segregation only in economies where
employers have a su¢ ciently strong "taste for discrimination."
Our results indicate that an exogenous intensi￿cation of competition substantively
boosted blacks￿relative wages and reduced racial segregation in states with a su¢ ciently
high degree of racial bias. In reduced form speci￿cations, bank deregulation that lowered
entry barriers facing non￿nancial ￿rms reduced the racial wage gap. In 2SLS, we use bank
deregulation to identify an exogenous intensi￿cation of competition. We ￿nd that the resul-
tant increase in competition eliminated more than one-￿fth of the preexisting black-white
wage di⁄erential in high racial bias states over a ￿ve year period. Furthermore and crit-
ically, we ￿nd that intensi￿ed competition reduced racial segregation, especially in high
racial bias states. These ￿ndings suggest that competition reduced the impact of racial
prejudices on blacks￿relative wages and enhanced the opportunities of black workers.
Looking forward, much work remains. The paper emphasizes the powerful role of com-
petition in expanding the economic opportunities of minorities. By reducing racial wage
di⁄erentials, competition could also increase the incentives for blacks to acquire skills.
Thus, future research might merge and extend taste-based and statistical-based explana-
tions of racial discrimination. This paper also advertises the need for additional research
on ￿nance and economic opportunity. In this paper, we show that improvements in the
functioning of banks substantively enhanced the economic opportunities of a disadvantaged
group. These improvements materialize not because banks make more loans to black en-
trepreneurs, but because improvements in banking disproportionately enhanced the labor
market opportunities of blacks.
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40Table 1 
 THE RACIAL BIAS INDEX, SURVEY MEASURES OF RACIAL PREJUDICE, AND RELATIVE WAGES 
Panel A: Correlation Coefficients Between the Different  
Fraction whites 













Measures of Taste for Discrimination     (1)  (2)  (3) 
Racial bias index 
 
0.36 0.35  0.31 
   
{0.02} {0.02}  {0.04} 
Observations 
 
43 43  43 
         
   
Panel B: Taste for Discrimination and  Dependent Variable: Relative Wages of Blacks 
Relative Wages of Blacks  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 







Marginal racial prejudice > median 
 
-.058*** -.042*** -.002 
   
(.015) (.015)  (.017) 
Share of blacks in 1970 ≥ 10% 
     
-.082*** 
       
(.013) 
Observations  10,076   10,076    10,076    10,076   
NOTE – Panel A reports correlation coefficients between (1) The racial bias index, which is based on interracial marriages in 1970, 
and (2) three recent survey-based indicators of racial prejudice from Charles and Guryan (2008). Panel B reports estimated 
coefficients from four regressions, where the dependent variable is blacks’ relative wage rates. Relative wages are conditional on 
five indicators of years of completed education (0-8, 9-11, 12, 13-15, and 16+) and a quartic in potential experience. Estimates are 
weighted by sampling weights provided by the Current Population Survey. In column (1), the regressor is an indicator which 
equals one if the racial bias index above the median and zero otherwise. In column (2) the regressor is an indicator which equals one 
if the marginal racial prejudice above the median and zero otherwise. The marginal racial prejudice index is the pth percentile of the 
distribution of an aggregate index of racial prejudice, where p is the percentile of workforce that is black. The marginal racial 
prejudice index is taken from Charles and Guryan (2008). Column (3) includes simultaneously the regressors from columns (1) and 
(2). In column (4) we also control for an indicator which equals one if the proportion of blacks in the workforce in 1970 is above 
10%. The regressions include black workers prior to interstate and intrastate bank deregulation, so that the reported number of 
observations equals 10,076. All regressions include year fixed effects. We do not include state fixed effects because the regressors are 
fixed for each state and do not change over time. Standard errors are clustered at the state-year level and appear in parentheses; p-
values are in brackets. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively.  
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BANK DEREGULATION AND LOG NEW INCORPORATIONS PER CAPITA 
   (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
Interstate dummy  .084*** 
 
.082** 









     
   
(.041) (.041) 
     
Interstate 


















       
.021*** .019** 
         
(.008) (.008) 
Intrastate squared 
       
-.0004* -.0004* 
         
(.0002) (.0002) 
             
Observations 882  882  882  882  882  882 
NOTE – The table shows the impact of various measures of bank deregulation on log new incorporations 
per capita. Robust standard errors are adjusted for state-level clustering and appear in parentheses. 
Intrastate dummy equals one in the years after a state permits branching via mergers and acquisitions 
and zero otherwise. Interstate dummy equals one in the years after a state permits interstate banking and 
zero otherwise. Interstate is equal to years since interstate deregulation and is equal to zero before 
interstate deregulation. Intrastate is equal to years since intrastate deregulation and is equal to zero before 
intrastate deregulation. New incorporations are from Dun and Bradstreet. Dates of intrastate and 
interstate bank deregulations are from Kroszner and Strahan (1999) and Amel (2008). The sample is for 
the years 1977-1994 and excludes Delaware and South Dakota. All regressions include state and year 









       
Racial Bias Index: 
       

















   (1)  (2)     (3)  (4)     (5)  (6)     (7)  (8) 















(Years since deregulation) x 
 
.003*** 
         
.004*** 
     
(Racial bias index > median) 
 
(.001) 
         
(.001) 
     
                       















Impact after five years 
                     







                       
Observations 73,801  73,801      48,367  25,434     73,801  73,801     48,367  25,434 
NOTE - The dependent variable is the relative wage rates of blacks. Relative wages are conditional on five indicators of years of completed education (0-8, 
9-11, 12, 13-15, and 16+) and a quartic in potential experience. Estimates are weighted by sampling weights provided by the Current Population Survey. 
Standard errors are adjusted for state-year clustering and appear in parentheses. All regressions include state and year fixed effects. The reported number 
of observations is for blacks only. Details about sample construction are in Appendix Table 2. In columns (1)-(4), “years since deregulation” stands for 
years since interstate deregulation; in columns (5)-(8), “years since deregulation” stands for years since intrastate deregulation. In columns (2) and (6), 
years since deregulation is interacted with an indicator which equals one if the racial bias index is above the median and zero otherwise. In columns (1), 
(2), (5), and (6) we include the entire sample. In columns (3) and (7) we include only states with racial bias index below the median. In columns (4) and (8) 
we include only states with racial bias index above the median. The racial bias index is based on rate of interracial marriages using the 1970 Census of 
Population. Appendix Table 3 lists the racial bias index for each state. The average initial racial wage gap is 17% for all states, 15% for states with a racial 











   
Racial Bias Index: 
   
Racial Bias Index: 
   
Racial Bias Index: 
 
All Below  Above 
 
All Below  Above 
 
All Below  Above 
 
States Median Median 
 
States Median Median 
 
States Median Median 
   (1)  (2)  (3)     (4)  (5)  (6)     (7) (8)  (9) 
Panel A: Relative Wage Rates are Conditional on Education and Potential Experience 
       
Log new incorporation per capita  .018  -.038  .137*** 
 
.042 -.080  .267*** 
 
.019 -.122**  .235*** 
 
(.022) (.023)  (.038) 
 
(.064) (.071)  (.071) 
 
(.048) (.054)  (.062) 
F-test of excluded instruments 
       
21.8 8.2  26.8 
 
3.0 2.3 113.5 
OIR test (p-value) 
       
.003 .174  .134 
 
.608 .518  .086 
Observations 37,876  24,754  13,122 
 
37,876  24,754 13,122 
 
37,876 24,754  13,122 
                       
Panel B: Relative Wage Rates are Conditional on Education, Potential Experience, and Occupation 
   
Log new incorporation per capita  .016  -.029  .122*** 
 
.023 -.026  .214*** 
 
.020 -.079  .198*** 
 
(.020) (.023)  (.037) 
 
(.064) (.071)  (.068) 
 
(.046) (.053)  (.058) 
F-test of excluded instruments 
       
21.8 8.2  26.8 
 
3.0 2.3 113.5 
OIR test (p-value) 
       
.046 .358  .123 
 
.845 .683  .082 
Observations 37,876  24,754  13,122 
 
37,876  24,754 13,122 
 
37,876 24,754  13,122 
NOTE - The dependent variable is the relative wage rates of blacks. In panel A, relative wages are conditional on five indicators of years of completed 
education (0-8, 9-11, 12, 13-15, and 16+) and a quartic in potential experience. In panel B, relative wages are conditional on five indicators of years of 
completed education (0-8, 9-11, 12, 13-15, and 16+), a quartic in potential experience, and occupation fixed effects. Estimates are weighted by sampling 
weights provided by the Current Population Survey. Standard errors are adjusted for state-year clustering and appear in parentheses. All regressions 
include state and year fixed effects. The reported number of observations is for blacks only. Details about sample construction are in Appendix Table 2. 
The sample is limited to the years 1977-1994 due to availability of log new incorporations per capita data. In columns (1), (4), and (7) we include the 
entire sample. In columns (2), (5), and (8) we include only states with racial bias index below the median. In columns (3), (6), and (9) we include only 
states with racial bias index above the median. The racial bias index is based on rate of interracial marriages using the 1970 Census of Population. 
Appendix Table 3 lists the racial bias index for each state. Columns (1)-(3) report Ordinary Least Squares estimates of the impact of log new 
incorporations per capita on the relative wage rates of blacks. Columns (4)-(9) report Two Stage Least Squares estimates of the impact of log new 
incorporations per capita on the relative wage rates of blacks. In columns (4)-(6), log new incorporations per capita are instrumented by years since 
interstate deregulation and years since intrastate deregulation. In columns (7)-(9), log new incorporations per capita are instrumented by dummy 
variables for each year before and after interstate deregulation and dummy variables for each year before and after intrastate deregulation. The F-test of 
excluded instruments reports the F-statistic from the first-stage. The OIR test reports the p-value of a J-statistic that test over-identifying restrictions. *, 
**, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively.  
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THE IMPACT OF LOG NEW INCORPORATIONS ON THE RELATIVE WAGES OF BLACKS: OLS AND 2SLS ESTIMATES 







Below Median   
Racial Bias 
Above Median   
Racial Bias 











   (1)  (2)     (3)  (4)     (5)  (6)     (7)  (8) 















                       
F-test of excluded instruments 




OIR test (p-value) 




Observations 24,272  8,093      12,942  29,121     24,272  8,093     12,942  29,121 
NOTE - The dependent variable is the relative wage rates of blacks. Relative wages are conditional on five indicators of years of 
completed education (0-8, 9-11, 12, 13-15, and 16+), a quartic in potential experience, and occupation fixed effects. Estimates are 
weighted by sampling weights provided by the Current Population Survey. Standard errors are adjusted for state-year clustering 
and appear in parentheses. All regressions include state and year fixed effects. The reported number of observations is for blacks 
only. Details about sample construction are in Appendix Table 2. The sample is limited to the years 1977-1994 due to availability of 
log new incorporations per capita data. “LLR” stands for the racial bias index and is based on rate of interracial marriages using the 
1970 Census of Population. Appendix Table 3 lists the racial bias index for each state. “CG” stands for the marginal racial prejudice 
which is obtained from Charles and Guryan (2008). In columns (1) and (5) we include only states with racial bias index below the 
median. In columns (3) and (7) we include only states with racial bias index above the median. In columns (2) and (6) we include 
only states with marginal racial prejudice below the median. In columns (4) and (8) we include only states with marginal racial 
prejudice above the median. Columns (1)-(4) report Ordinary Least Squares estimates of the impact of log new incorporations per 
capita on the relative wage rates of blacks. Columns (5)-(8) report Two Stage Least Squares estimates of the impact of log new 
incorporations per capita on the relative wage rates of blacks. Log new incorporations per capita are instrumented by dummy 
variables for each year before and after interstate deregulation and dummy variables for each year before and after intrastate 
deregulation. The F-test of excluded instruments reports the F-statistic from the first-stage. The OIR test reports the p-value of a J-
statistic that test over-identifying restrictions. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively. 
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working in a white industry 
 

































   (1)  (2)     (3)  (4)     (5)  (6)     (7) (8) 
Panel A: Racial Bias Index 
             






















                       
Panel B: Marginal Racial Prejudice 
                 















Observations 8,093  29,121      8,093 29,121      8,064 29,034      8,064 29,034 
NOTE – The dependent variable in columns (1)-(4) is proportion of “excess” whites in an industry, where the proportion of “excess” whites is the proportion of 
whites that is unexplained by years of completed education (0-8, 9-11, 12, 13-15, and 16+), a quartic in potential experience, and occupation fixed effects. The 
dependent variable in columns (5)-(8) is proportion of white managers in an industry. Estimates are weighted by sampling weights provided by the Current 
Population Survey. Standard errors are adjusted for state-year clustering and appear in parentheses. All regressions include state and year fixed effects. The 
reported number of observations is for blacks only. Details about sample construction are in Appendix Table 2. The sample is limited to the years 1977-1994 due to 
availability of log new incorporations per capita data. In columns (1), (3), (5), and (7) we include only states with racial prejudice below the median. In columns (2), 
(4), (6), and (8) we include only states with racial prejudice above the median. In panel A, racial prejudice is the racial bias index which is based on rate of 
interracial marriages using the 1970 Census of Population. Appendix Table 3 lists the racial bias index for each state. In panel B, racial prejudice is the marginal 
racial prejudice which is obtained from Charles and Guryan (2008). Columns (1), (2), (5), and (6) report Ordinary Least Squares estimates, while columns (3), (4), 
(7), and (8) report Two Stage Least Squares. Log new incorporations per capita are instrumented by dummy variables for each year before and after interstate 
deregulation and dummy variables for each year before and after intrastate deregulation. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively. 
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THE IMPACT OF LOG NEW INCORPORATIONS PER CAPITA ON RELATIVE WAGE RATES: OLS AND 2SLS ESTIMATES 







   
Racial Bias Index: 
   
Racial Bias Index: 
   
Racial Bias Index: 
 
All Below  Above 
 
All Below  Above 
 
All Below  Above 
 
States Median Median 
 
States Median Median 
 
States Median Median 
   (1)  (2)  (3)     (4)  (5)  (6)     (7) (8)  (9) 
Log new incorporation per capita  .018  -.024  .123*** 
 
-.012 .010 .190*** 
 
.005 -.043  .172*** 
 
(.020) (.022)  (.035) 
 
(.061) (.070)  (.067) 
 
(.042) (.048)  (.056) 
F-test of excluded instruments 
       
21.8 8.2  26.8 
 
3.0 2.3 113.5 
OIR test (p-value) 
       
.316 .813  .051 
 
.814 .638  .122 
Observations 37,876  24,754  13,122      37,876  24,754 13,122      37,876 24,754  13,122 
NOTE - The dependent variable is the relative wage rates of blacks. Relative wages are conditional on five indicators of years of completed education (0-
8, 9-11, 12, 13-15, and 16+), a quartic in potential experience, occupation fixed effects, and industry fixed effects. Estimates are weighted by sampling 
weights provided by the Current Population Survey. Standard errors are adjusted for state-year clustering and appear in parentheses. All regressions 
include state and year fixed effects. The reported number of observations is for blacks only. Details about sample construction are in Appendix Table 2. 
The sample is limited to the years 1977-1994 due to availability of log new incorporations per capita data. In columns (1), (4), and (7) we include the 
entire sample. In columns (2), (5), and (8) we include only states with racial bias index below the median. In columns (3), (6), and (9) we include only 
states with racial bias index above the median. The racial bias index is based on rate of interracial marriages using the 1970 Census of Population. 
Appendix Table 3 lists the racial bias index for each state. Columns (1)-(3) report Ordinary Least Squares estimates of the impact of log new 
incorporations per capita on the relative wage rates of blacks. Columns (4)-(9) report Two Stage Least Squares estimates of the impact of log new 
incorporations per capita on the relative wage rates of blacks. In columns (4)-(6), log new incorporations per capita are instrumented by years since 
interstate deregulation and years since intrastate deregulation. In columns (7)-(9), log new incorporations per capita are instrumented by dummy 
variables for each year before and after interstate deregulation and dummy variables for each year before and after intrastate deregulation. The F-test of 
excluded instruments reports the F-statistic from the first-stage. The OIR test reports the p-value of a J-statistic that test over-identifying restrictions. *, 
**, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively. 
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RELATIVE LOG HOURLY WAGES AND ANNUAL WORKING HOURS IN HIGH RACIAL BIAS STATES 
  Annual Hours    Log(Annual Hours) 
 All  All  Hours>0  All    All  All 
 OLS  Tobit  OLS  2SLS    OLS  2SLS 
  (1) (2)  (3)  (4)     (5)  (6) 
Projected relative log hourly wage  377*  376*  424*      .658**   
 (223)  (223)  (223)      (0.285)   
              
Log new incorporations per capita        59      .271*** 
       (105)      (.106) 
Instruments:              
Years since deregulation  Yes Yes  Yes  Yes   Yes  Yes 
Years since deregulation squared Yes Yes  Yes  Yes   Yes  Yes 
              
F-test of excluded instruments  21.5  21.5  21.5  21.7    21.5  21.3 
OIR test (p-value)  .19  .19  .19  .39    .19  .49 
Observations 20,556  20,556  16,951  20,556      16,951  16,951 
NOTE - The dependent variable is either hours worked or the log of hours worked. Thus, some specifications include all 
working-age black males, while others include only working black males. Estimates are weighted by sampling weights 
provided by the Current Population Survey. Standard errors are adjusted for state-year clustering and appear in 
parentheses. In regressions (1) – (3) and (4), the standard errors are bootstrapped. All regressions include state and year 
fixed effects. The analysis excludes states with below the median values of the racial bias index. Data on new 
incorporations per capita are available for the period 1977-1994. “Years since deregulation” includes both years since 
interstate deregulation and years since intrastate deregulation. The F-test of excluded instruments reports the F-statistic 
from the first-stage. The OIR test reports the p-value of a J-statistic that test over-identifying restrictions. *, **, and *** 
indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. 
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Racial Bias Index 
Below Median 
 
Racial Bias Index 
Above Median 
 (1)  (2)      (3)  (4)    (5)  (6) 
1 if person reports wages   .066***  .075***  .064***  .070***   .069***  .082*** 
 (.003)  (.003)    (.003)  (.004)    (.005)  (.005) 
Interstate -.004***      -.005***      -.001   
 (.001)      (.001)      (.003)   
Interstate x (1 if person reports wages) .002***      .002***      .002***   
 (.000)      (.000)      (.000)   
Intrastate   -.001      -.001      -.000 
   (.000)      (.001)     (.001) 
Intrastate x (1 if person reports wages)   .001***      .001***      .000 
   (.000)      (.000)     (.000) 
               
Impact of deregulation on observable skills of black workers  -.002  .0001    -.003*  .0003   .001  -.0002 
H0: (Years since deregulation) x (1 if person reports wages) = 0  (.001)  (.0005)    (.001)  (.0006)    (.002)  (.0008) 
               
Observations 116,593  116,593      77,301  77,301    39,292  39,292 
NOTE - The dependent variable is the predicted relative wages of blacks. Relative wages are conditional on five indicators of years of completed education (0-8, 
9-11, 12, 13-15, and 16+) and a quartic in potential experience. Estimates are weighted by sampling weights provided by the Current Population Survey. 
Standard errors are adjusted for state-year clustering and appear in parentheses. All regressions control for state and year fixed effects. The reported number of 
observations is for blacks only. Details about sample construction are in Appendix Table 2. The sample is limited to the years 1977-1994 due to availability of log 
new incorporations per capita data. In columns (1) and (2) we include the entire sample. In columns (3) and (4) we include only states with racial bias index 
below the median. In columns (5) and (6) we include only states with racial bias index above the median. The racial bias index is based on rate of interracial 
marriages using the 1970 Census of Population. Appendix Table 3 lists the racial bias index for each state. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 
1% respectively. 
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DATES OF INTRASTATE AND INTERSTATE DEREGULATIONS, BY STATES 
    Type of deregulation:        Type of deregulation: 










Alabama  AL  1981 1987    Montana  MT  1990 1993 
Alaska  AK  1960 1982    Nebraska  NE  1985 1990 
Arizona  AZ  1960 1986    Nevada  NV  1960 1985 
Arkansas  AR  1994 1989    New  Hampshire  NH  1987 1987 
California  CA  1960 1987    New  Jersey  NJ  1977 1986 
Colorado  CO  1991 1988    New  Mexico  NM  1991 1989 
Connecticut  CT  1980 1983    New  York  NY  1976 1982 
District of Columbia  DC  1960  1985    North Carolina  NC  1960  1985 
Florida  FL  1988 1985    North  Dakota  ND  1987 1991 
Georgia  GA  1983 1985    Ohio  OH  1979 1985 
Hawaii  HI  1986 1997    Oklahoma  OK  1988 1987 
Idaho  ID  1960 1985    Oregon  OR  1985 1986 
Illinois  IL  1988 1986    Pennsylvania  PA  1982 1986 
Indiana  IN  1989 1986    Rhode  Island  RI  1960 1984 
Iowa  IA  1999 1991    South  Carolina  SC  1960 1986 
Kansas  KS  1987 1992    Tennessee  TN  1985 1985 
Kentucky  KY  1990 1984    Texas  TX  1988 1987 
Louisiana  LA 1988  1987    Utah  UT 1981  1984 
Maine  ME  1975 1978    Vermont  VT  1970 1988 
Maryland  MD  1960 1985    Virginia  VA  1978 1985 
Massachusetts  MA  1984 1983    Washington  WA  1985 1987 
Michigan  MI  1987 1986    West  Virginia  WV  1987 1988 
Minnesota  MN 1993 1986    Wisconsin  WI  1990 1987 
Mississippi MS  1986  1988   Wyoming  WY  1988  1987 
Missouri  MO  1990  1986                
NOTE - Dates of intrastate and interstate deregulations are taken from Kroszner and Strahan (1999). 
 
50Appendix Table 2 
SUMMARY STATISTICS: NUMBER OF OBSERVATIONS 
  
Restriction / Selection Rule  Observations 
   
All observations in sample years 1977 to 2007  5,085,135 
   
Civilian adults, not in group quarters, with positive sampling weight and    3,805,475 
non-missing demographics such as: age, gender, state and region of residence,    
marital status, and education   
   
Excluding:   
Observations in Delaware and South Dakota  3,712,856 
Women  1,749,618 
Younger than 18 or older than 65  1,392,503 
More than 50 years of potential experience  1,337,897 
Hispanics or other race groups but Whites or Blacks  1,149,855 
   
Main sample:   
Whites  1,033,262 
Blacks  116,593 
   
Wage sample:   
All  756,996 
Whites  683,195 
Blacks  73,801 
NOTE - March Current Population Survey data were obtained from <http://cps.ipums.org/cps/>. We start in Survey 
year 1977 because that is when the CPS reports information on each person's exact state of residence. The 2007 Survey is 
the latest Survey available. We exclude Delaware and South Dakota due to large concentration of credit card banks in 
these two states. The ‘wage sample’ differs from the ‘main sample’ in that we drop self-employed and agricultural 
workers, workers in private household sector, those with wages below the 1st and above the 97th percentile of year-
specific wage distribution of full-time, full-year workers (i.e., those who work at least 50 weeks per year and at least 35 
hours per week). Finally, we include in the ‘wage sample’ only wage and salary workers. 
 
51Appendix Table 3 
RACIAL BIAS INDEX BY STATES, 1970 
States with racial bias index < median    States with racial bias index > median 
State  Racial Bias Index    State  Racial Bias Index 
Alaska 0.00    Arkansas  0.30 
Hawaii 0.07    Virginia  0.30 
Washington 0.10    South  Dakota  0.30 
New York  0.11    Colorado  0.30 
Nevada 0.12    North  Carolina  0.32 
California 0.15    Texas  0.32 
District of Columbia  0.18    Nebraska  0.32 
Delaware 0.24    Minnesota  0.32 
South Carolina  0.24    Mississippi  0.33 
New Jersey  0.25    Oregon  0.33 
Pennsylvania 0.25    Louisiana  0.33 
Michigan 0.26    Georgia 0.34 
Kentucky 0.26    Oklahoma  0.35 
Illinois 0.26    Indiana  0.35 
Maryland 0.27    Alabama  0.35 
Connecticut 0.27    Wisconsin 0.36 
Rhode island  0.27    Vermont  0.36 
New Mexico  0.27    Utah  0.37 
Kansas 0.28    Idaho  0.37 
Massachusetts 0.28    Tennessee  0.39 
Ohio 0.28    Iowa  0.39 
Missouri 0.28    Montana  0.40 
Arizona 0.29    North  Dakota  0.43 
Florida 0.29    West  Virginia  0.45 
     Maine  0.45 
     Wyoming  0.46 
         New Hampshire  0.46 
NOTE - The racial bias index is based on inter-racial marriage data obtained from the 1970 Census of Population. The sample 
includes married whites and blacks between that ages of 18 to 65, and excludes couples in which at least one person is living 
in group quarters or has missing data on race, gender, state of residence, marital status, or educational attainment. The racial 
bias index is based on the difference between the estimated rate of inter-racial marriage in 1970, where the estimation is 
based on each state’s racial composition along with each individual’s education and age characteristics, and the actual rate of 
inter-racial marriage. Larger values of the racial bias index signify that the actual rate of inter-racial marriage is 
correspondingly smaller than the estimated rate. 
 
52Figure 1 
TRENDS AND INNOVATIONS IN THE RELATIVE WAGE RATES OF BLACKS PRIOR TO BANK DEREGULATION 
 
NOTE  –  Figures A and B plot the year of bank deregulation against the average black-white wage 
differential prior to deregulation. In Figure A we consider years prior to interstate deregulation. In Figure 
B we consider years prior to intrastate deregulation. Figures C and D plot the year of bank deregulation 
against the change in the black-white wage differential prior to deregulation. In Figure C we consider 
years prior to interstate deregulation. In Figure D we consider years prior to intrastate deregulation. All 
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53Figure 2 
THE IMPACT OF DEREGULATION ON ENTRY OF FIRMS 
 
SOURCES  –  Data on new corporations per capita are taken from Black and Strahan (2002). Dates of intrastate and interstate 
deregulations are taken from Kroszner and Strahan (1999). 
NOTE – The figures plot the impact of interstate and intrastate bank deregulations on log new corporations per capita. The upper 
figure is for states with racial bias index above the median. The lower figure is for state with racial bias index below the median. We 
consider an 18 years window spanning from 9 years before deregulations until 9 years after deregulations. The solid lines represent 
the impact of intrastate deregulation on log new per capita. The dashed lines represent the impact of interstate deregulation on log 
new corporations per capita. Specifically, we report estimated coefficients from the following regression: 
Yst = α + β1Intra-9 + γ1Inter-9 + β2Intra-8 + γ2Inter-8 + … + β18Intra+9 + γ18Inter+9 + δs + δt + εst 
Yst is log new corporations per capita in state s and year t. Intra-j equals one for states in the jth year before intrastate deregulation 
and equals zero otherwise. Intra+k equals one for states in the kth year after intrastate deregulation and equals zero otherwise. 
Similarly, Inter-j equals one in states in the jth year before interstate deregulation and equals zero otherwise. Inter+k equals one in 
states in the kth year after interstate deregulation and equals zero otherwise. δs and δt are state and year fixed effects, respectively. 
We exclude the year of intrastate and interstate deregulation, thus estimating the dynamic effect of deregulation on log new 
corporations per capita relative to the corresponding year of deregulation. We de-trend the coefficients by prior trends and 
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54Figure 3 
THE IMPACT OF DEREGULATION ON THE RELATIVE WAGE RATES OF BLACKS 
 
NOTE – The figures plot the impact of interstate and intrastate bank deregulations on the relative wage rates of blacks. The upper 
figure is for states with racial bias index above the median. The lower figure is for state with racial bias index below the median. We 
consider a 25 year window, spanning from 10 years before deregulation until 15 years after deregulation. The solid lines represent 
the impact of intrastate deregulation on the relative wage rates of blacks. The dashed lines represent the impact of interstate 
deregulation on the relative wage rates of blacks. Specifically, we report estimated coefficients from the following regression: 
ist t s st st st
B
ist v D D D R + + + + + + + =






1 ... ˆ  
The D’s equal zero, except as follows: D-j equals one for states in the jth year before deregulation, while D+j equals one for states in 
the jth year after deregulation. We exclude the year of deregulation, thus estimating the dynamic effect of deregulation on the 
relative wage rates of blacks relative to the year of deregulation. We de-trend the coefficients by prior trends and normalize their 
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55Figure 4 
THE IMPACT OF LOG NEW INCORPORATIONS PER CAPITA ON THE RELATIVE WAGE RATES OF BLACKS 
DIFFERENT OLS AND 2SLS SPECIFICATIONS 
(DASHED LINES REPRESENT 95% CONFIDENCE INTERVALS) 
 
NOTE – The circles represent the estimated impact of log new incorporations per capita on the relative wages of blacks. The dashed 
lines represent the corresponding 95% confidence intervals, adjusted for state and year clustering. The estimated coefficients and the 
confidence intervals are from twelve different specifications. The notation in the specifications is as follows: OLS – Ordinary Least 
Squares; 2SLS Linear – Two-Stage Least Squares with Interstate and Intrastate entering linearly;  2SLS Non-param – Two-Stage 
Least Squares with Interstate and Intrastate entering non-parametrically;  R – relative wages of blacks, where the relative wages are 
conditional on years of completed education and quartic in potential experience; Ro - relative wages of blacks, where the relative 
wages are conditional on years of completed education, a quartic in potential experience, and occupation fixed effects; LLR – states 
with racial bias index above the median; CG – states with marginal racial prejudice (From Charles and Guryan, 2008) above the 
median. The different specifications are: (1) OLS, with relative wages conditional on education and experience, in states below the 
median racial bias index, (2) OLS, with relative wages conditional on education, experience, and occupation, in states below the 
median racial bias index, (3) OLS, with relative wages conditional on education and experience, in states below the median marginal 
racial prejudice, (4) OLS, with relative wages conditional on education, experience, and occupation, in states below the median 
marginal racial prejudice, (5) 2SLS with linear instruments, relative wages conditional on education and experience, in states below 
the median racial bias index, (6) 2SLS with linear instruments, relative wages conditional on education, experience, and occupation, 
in states below the median racial bias index, (7) 2SLS with linear instruments, relative wages conditional on education and 
experience, in states below the median marginal racial prejudice, (8) 2SLS with linear instruments, relative wages conditional on 
education, experience, and occupation, in states below the median marginal racial prejudice, (9) 2SLS with non-parametric 
instruments, relative wages conditional on education and experience, in states below the median racial bias index, (10) 2SLS with 
non-parametric instruments, relative wages conditional on education, experience, and occupation, in states below the median racial 
bias index, (11) 2SLS with non-parametric instruments, relative wages conditional on education and experience, in states below the 
median marginal racial prejudice, (12) 2SLS with non-parametric instruments, relative wages conditional on education, experience, 
and occupation, in states below the median marginal racial prejudice. Measures of marginal racial prejudice are obtained from 


























































(1) OLS, R, LLR
(2) OLS, Ro, LLR
(3) OLS, R, CG
(4) OLS, Ro, CG
(5) 2SLS Linear, R, LLR
(6) 2SLS Linear, Ro, LLR
(7) 2SLS Linear, R, CG
(8) 2SLS Linear, Ro, CG
(9) 2SLS Non-param, R, LLR
(10) 2SLS Non-param, Ro, LLR
(11) 2SLS Non-param, R, CG




THE LOCATION OF BLACKS IN THE WHITE WAGE DISTRIBUTION BEFORE AND AFTER DEREGULATION 
 
NOTE – The figures provide rank analyses and compare the change in black workers’ 
relative wages with those of comparable whites across the full distribution of wage 
rates, before and after bank deregulation. The results in the plots were obtained using 
the following procedure: First, we calculate residuals for black and white workers from 
equation (7). We keep 100 black workers, each corresponding to a different percentile 
of black workers’ relative log hourly wage distribution. Next, we calculate their 
position in the white workers’ log hourly wage distribution. We repeat this procedure 
before (solid line) and after (dashed line) inter- and intrastate deregulations. The upper 
figures refer to states with racial bias index above the median. The lower figures refer 
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